(Plus de détails à venir/More details to come)


  • 21 sept. 2018 :

Pamela Hieronymi (UCLA) “Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of Morals”   

10h-12h – Salle : en vidéoconférence, salle P-217, Pavillon Roger-Gaudry, (2900 Jean-Brillant, Université de Montréal)

Abstract :

Fifty-five years after its publication, P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” continues to inspire important work.  Its main legacy has been the notion of “reactive attitudes.”  Surprisingly, Strawson’s central argument—an argument to the conclusion that no general thesis (such as the thesis of determinism) could provide us reason to abandon these attitudes—has received little attention.  In a short manuscript, I am arguing that neither of the standard interpretations are correct.  Strawson’s argument relies on an underlying picture of the nature of moral demands and moral relationships—a picture that has gone largely unnoticed, that is naturalistic without being reductionistic, and that is, I think, worthy of serious consideration.   After very briefly presenting the main outlines of my interpretation, I will, in this presentation, focus on objections to Strawson’s underlying, naturalistic picture.  Though the objections are serious, I believe robust replies can be provided on Strawson’s behalf.


  • 12 oct. 2018 :

Dana Nelkin (University of California, San Diego) 

“Equal Opportunity: A Unifying Framework for Moral, Aesthetic, and Epistemic Responsibility”

13h-15h – Salle :W-5215 – Pavillon Thérèse-Casgrain – UQÀM- en collaboration avec Fillosophie –

Abstract :

We naturally speak about moral obligations (e.g., “you ought to have kept your promise”) and we speak about epistemic ones and even sometimes what look like aesthetic ones, too (e.g., “you ought to have known that the polls were within the margin of error” and “you should have done better with that painting”).  Similarly, we blame and praise people for epistemic and aesthetic transgressions and achievements, as well as moral ones.  For these reasons, it is natural to conclude that our moral, aesthetic and epistemic practices should be treated in highly parallel ways, at least when it comes to the realm of holding responsible, praiseworthy, and blameworthy.  At the same time, there are clear asymmetries between the moral and epistemic case, and also between the moral and the aesthetic, which might seem to doom any hope for a genuinely parallel treatment.  For example, as many have pointed out, unlike actions or omissions, which are central objects of moral obligations, praise and blame, belief does not seem to be the kind of thing one has control over.  When it comes to the aesthetic case, many have doubted that we have obligations in the way that we do in the other cases.  Further, moral blame has seemed to many to be governed by a number of interpersonal norms that don’t seem to have parallels in either the pure epistemic or pure aesthetic case.  Despite these challenges, I argue that the prospects are promising for a unifying framework that applies in all three cases while at the same time leaving room for divergence on some important dimensions.  In particular, in this paper, I pursue the idea that one’s degree of blameworthiness or praiseworthiness depends on the quality of one’s opportunity in a given case.


  • 26 oct. 2018 :

Paul Boghossian (New York University) “The Boundaries of Inference”

15h-17h – Salle : 201, S Annex (2145 Mackay), Sir George Williams Campus, Concordia University, H3N 1M8


I will look at how we should decide the question what inference is and discuss some objections to my ‘intellectualist’ and ‘agential’ conception of inference.


  • 7 déc. 2018 :

Stephanie Leary (McGill) “What is Moorean Non-naturalism?” 

10h-12h – Salle : 223 – Stone Castle – 2910 bvd Édouard-Montpetit (Université de Montréal)


Most metaethicists take the sort of non-naturalist view endorsed by Moore and his followers to amount to either a claim about identity or a claim about grounding. In this paper, however, I argue that specifying non-naturalism just in terms of identity is at best not illuminating, and specifying the view in terms of grounding either makes the naturalism vs. non-naturalism debate settled by general metaphysical considerations or fails to make room for Moore himself to count as a genuine non-naturalist. So, instead, I propose that we understand the view in terms of essence: specifically, as the claim that the essences of at least some normative properties cannot be ultimately specified in entirely non-normative terms and do not specify non-normative sufficient conditions for their instantiation. Characterizing the view in these terms most clearly captures the non-naturalist’s core pre-theoretical claims in a way that makes it a substantive, local view about normative properties and makes room for Moore.

Années précédentes