Ateliers/Workshops GRIN

(Plus de détails à venir/More details to come)

  • 18 décembre 2020 @ 10:00 – 12:00
Table ronde: Perspectives on Well-Being
OÙ :Zoom

Le GRIN invite ses membres à une table ronde organisée par Pablo Gilabert, Mauro Rossi et Christine Tappolet sur le thème « Perspectives on Well-Being ». Deux textes seront discutés, un par Pablo Gilabert et un autre par Mauro Rossi et Christine Tappolet.

La lecture des deux textes au préalable est exigée. Pour obtenir les textes à lire ainsi que le lien zoom pour participer à la rencontre, il faut écrire à la coordonnatrice du CRÉ à l’adresse valery.giroux@umontreal.ca.


  • 19 février 2021 @ 10:00 – 11:30

Conférence GRIN: On the placebo effect

OÙ: Zoom

Présentation de Phoebe Friesen (McGill) au GRIN/CRÉ. Phoebe nous parlera de ses travaux entourant l’effet placebo.


  • 16 avril 2021 @10:00 – 12:00

Conférence GRIN/CRÉ: Anger and its desires

Présentation ZOOM de Laura Silva (Swiss Center for Affective Sciences).

Abstract: The orthodox view of anger takes desires for revenge or retribution to be central to the emotion. In this paper, I develop an empirically informed challenge to the retributive view of anger. In so doing, I argue that a distinct desire is central to anger: a desire for recognition. Desires for recognition aim at the targets of anger acknowledging the wrong they have committed, as opposed to aiming for their suffering. In light of the centrality of this desire for recognition, I argue that the retributive view of anger should be abandoned. I consider and dismiss two types of moves that can be made on the part of a proponent of the orthodox view in response to my argument. I propose that a pluralist view, which allows for both retribution and recognition in anger, is to be preferred, and conclude by considering some of my argument’s normative implications.


  • 14 – 16 mai 2021

Fittingness conference

Colloque organisé par Chris Howard (McGill) et Richard Rowland (Leeds).
Le colloque est ouvert aux membres du GRIN et du CRÉ, ainsi que leurs postdocs et chercheurs invités.
Pour s’inscrire ou pour plus d’infomations: chris.howard@mcgill.ca.


  • 19 mai 2021 @ 9:20-14:35

Workshop CRÉ/GRIN: Resilience in Action and Belief

Resilience is commonly understood as the ability that agents exhibit in stressful, uncertain, or challenging situations, when they ‘bounce back,’ adapt, and thrive despite adversity. This workshop is dedicated to a philosophical exploration of the epistemic and practical aspects of human resilience, in particular via the notions of grit, hope, and coping.


  • Semaine du 7 juin

École CRÉ/GRIN/SoPhA, sur le thème Éthique et rationalité.

Plus d’informations à venir.



Ateliers/Workshops GRIN


  • 13 septembre 2019, 10h-12h.

Raamy Majeed (Auckland) “Do Recalcitrant Emotions Show that Emotions are Modular?”

Salle/Room: 422, Stone Castle, Université de Montréal (2910 Édouard-Montpetit)


The occurrence of recalcitrant emotions, i.e. emotional episodes that are in conflict with our considered judgements, are used as unproblematic means of motivating the view that emotions are modular: roughly, that they are cognitive capacities which are explained by mental components functionally dissociable from other parts of the mind. In this paper, I argue that recalcitrant emotions don’t, by themselves, show that emotions are modular in a non-trivial sense.


  • 20 septembre 2019, 10h-12h.

Victoria McGeer (Princeton) “Empathy Internalized: On the scaffolding power of self-directed emotion.”

Salle/Room: Leacock 927, McGill University (855 Rue Sherbrooke Ouest)


It is commonly accepted that empathy plays a key role in moral agency.  More deeply, it is often held to play a critical role in (adult) moral development by generating self-castigating emotions of guilt, shame and remorse when we are brought face to face with the wrongs we do to others.  In defense of this commonsense view, I argue the self-castigating emotions can be epistemically valuable so far as they promote insight into our conduct and character that may be necessary for such development.  But more problematically, these emotions can also be motivationally counterproductive for such development.  To overcome this problem, I examine the conditions under which these self-castigating emotions can be managed, contained or metabolized, thereby supporting rather than defeating our self-development.  My claim will be that forging an empathetic connection with our own erring self is an essential part of this developmental process.


  • 27 septembre 2019, 10h-12h.

Michael Titelbaum (Winsconsin-Madison) “The Logical Firmament”

Salle/Room: 422, Stone Castle, (2910 Édouard-Montpetit, Université de Montréal)


Most work in the epistemology of logic asks how inferential rules are known, and how individual steps in a proof are justified.  But what happens when single steps are composed into a complex derivation?  A new set of facts—“combinational facts”—come into play, which have been undertheorized despite being at the heart of such phenomena as logical non-omniscience.  I will ask how recognition of these facts might alter our epistemology of logic.  And I will make a tentative proposal for how combinational facts come to be known.


  • 1er octobre 2019, 15h-17h.

Hille Paakkunainen (Syracuse), invitée à Concordia. “Virtue and Practical Inference” | Concordia Philosophy Speaker Series

In this talk, Dr. Hille Paakkunainen will argue that virtues of character are dispositions of practical inference, and that neo-Humean belief-desire psychology is inadequate to account for them.


Karen Frost-Arnold (Hobart and William Smith Colleges) J. Adam Carter (University of Glasgow)

The digital age poses new challenges for epistemology. Digital technologies have become central to how we form, revise, and maintain our beliefs. How should we approach this recent development as epistemologists? What is the epistemological significance of our increasing reliance on, e.g., anonymous online sources, social media, personalized news feeds and search engines? What does the widespread use of AI and opaque algorithms mean for our lives as knowers, testifiers, and reasoners? Do new epistemic responsibilities arise in the digital world? How can we, as epistemologists, contribute to making sense of these developments?


  • 22 novembre 2019, 10h-16h.

Workshop sur On Being a Believer de David Hunter (Ryerson)

Salle/Room: A-2407, pavillon Maximilien-Caron, Université de Montréal (3101, chemin de la tour, Montréal, Qc.)

Résumé/Abstract: This book is about being a believer, about having a cognitive perspective on the world.


  • 10 janvier 2020, 10h-12h.

Kate Nolfi (Vermont) – GRIN/Thème phare éthique féministe

Salle/Room: W-5215,  5e étage Pavillon Thérèse-Casgrain (W), UQAM (455, Boulevard René-Lévesque Est)


  • 6 février 2020, 17h – 19h.

5 à 7 du GRIN/CRÉ

Brasserie Saint-Hublon, 5414 Gatineau, Montréal, H3T 1X5

Le GRIN et le CRÉ sont ravis de vous convier à un 5 à 7, à l’occasion duquel Stephanie Leary (McGill), Christopher Howard (McGill) et Jonathan Simon (UdeM) présenteront leurs travaux. Les présentations d’une vingtaine de minutes chacune seront suivies, à tour de rôle, d’une période de discussion d’une même durée.


  • 13 février 2020, 15h-17h.

Jesse Prinz & Sarah Arnaud (CUNY) : “Are There Emotions in the Brain?”

Salle/Room: W-5215, Pav. Thérèse Casgrain, UQAM (455 Boulevard René-Lévesque E, Montréal, QC H2L 4Y2)

Résumé/Abstract: Against an emerging tide of “constructionism” about discrete emotions, there are long-stranding research programs that claim to establish physiological correlates. Work on expressive behavior has moved beyond static faces to dynamic expressions, vocal patterns, and posture to find more robust analogues of discrete emotions in the body, and new work using pattern classifiers purports to establish that folk categories map onto the CNS and ANS. These views lobby for the possibility that folk categories can be more neatly reduced to physiology. Thus, the scientific status of discrete emotions remains in limbo. Here we steer a course between constructionism and reductionism, proposing an account of discrete emotions that takes both sides seriously. Work in the constructionist tradition testifies to considerably plasticity and against domain specificity at the level of neural implementation. Work by reductionists suggests that patterns can nevertheless emerge. We argue for a “reconstructionist” view, according to which discrete categories map only multiple bio-culturally constructed patterns.


  • 12 mars 2020, 13h30 – 16h.

Ethical Knowledge and Deep Learning, with Preston Werner (Hebrew U, Jerusalem); Jonna Vance (Northern Arizona U); Ana Gantman (Brooklyn College).

MILA, auditorium 1, 6650 Saint-Urbain, 2e étage


  • 13 mars 2020.

Journée de travail en philosophie analytique, ULaval



Responsabilité, normativité et langage – En hommage à Daniel Laurier

Lieu: salle C-1017-11, Carrefour des arts, Pavillon Lionel Groulx, 3150, rue Jean-Brillan,
métro Université de Montréal

10:00-10:50 Montminy, Blameworthiness, Foreseeability and Causal Deviance
10:50-11:40 Paul Bernier, Karma et responsabilité morale dans le bouddhisme des origines
13:30-14:20 Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette, PAP ssi DIP?
14:20-15:10 Martin Rémi Tison, Intentions de communication et cognition « de bas niveau »
15:20-16:10 Marc-Kevin Daoust, The Deontic Force of Apparent Reasons
16:10-17:00 Charles Côté-Bouchard, Déontologismes et involontarisme doxastique


  • 27 et 28 mars 2020 -Annulé-

Virtue Ethics and Politics Workshop: The Personal and the Common Good

Room LB-362 (Third floor of the Webster Library), J.W. McConnell Bldg , Concordia University, SGW Campus, 1400 Maisonneuve Blvd W.



Robin Dembroff (Yale University) – GRIN/Thème phare éthique féministe

Salle/Room: 422, Stone Castle, (2910 Édouard-Montpetit, Université de Montréal)



Miriam McCormick (University of Richmond) “Belief as Emotion”

Salle/Room: 422, Stone Castle, (2910 Édouard-Montpetit, Université de Montréal)


It is commonly held that (i) beliefs are evidence-sensitive and (ii) beliefs are connected to actions in reliable and predictable ways. Given such a view, many argue that if a mental state fails to respond to evidence or doesn’t result in the kind of behavior typical or expected of belief, it is not a belief after all, but a different state. Yet, one finds seeming counter examples of resilient beliefs that fail to respond to evidence, or that do not connect to action in the way we would expect them to. I offer a view of belief that does not force us to exclude states as real beliefs that we pre-reflectively think of as beliefs, and that does not require us to “outsource” the work belief seems to do to other mental states. Rather than assume that belief is a purely cognitive state, I propose that we view belief as a type of emotion where emotions are understood as including cognitive and non-cognitive elements. Thinking of beliefs as emotions can help us make sense of resilient or recalcitrant beliefs, of seeming breakdowns between belief and actions, and offer insight into the phenomena of persistent disagreement and self-deception.

  • 12 et 13 mai 2020

Éthique, Justice et Connaissance / Ethics, Justice and Knowledge

Salle/Room: Zoom (écrire à valery.giroux@umontreal.ca)

Sébastien Gambs, Université du Québec à Montréal, « Respect de la vie privée et problématiques éthiques à l’ère des données massives »
Prabhpal Singh, University of Waterloo, “After-Birth Abortion, Moral Status, and the Relational View”
Anne-Marie Gagné-Julien, Université du Québec à Montréal, « La médicalisation des troubles mentaux, les injustices épsitémiques et l’objectivité sociale »
Aude Bandini, Université de Montréal, « Le paternalisme épistémique dans la relation de soin »
Aušra Kaziliūnaitė, Vilnius University, « Foucault’s panopticism and ethics of modern surveillance: ‘plague stricken down’ reactualisation during corona crises”
Michaël Lessard, University of Toronto, (Faculty of Law), « Reconnaître la sensibilité des animaux peut-il les protéger? »
Samuel Dishaw, Harvard University, “Duties to Future Generations : Rethinking the No-Difference View”
Russ Shafer-Laudau, University of Wisconsin, Madison, “Conceptual Moral Truths”

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