Ateliers/Workshops GRIN

(Plus de détails à venir/More details to come)

  • 24 septembre 2021 @ 10:00 – 11:30

Sara Potrasi (University of Puget Sound)

Envy and Prejudice: The Role of Envy in a Racially Divided Public Sphere

Présentation ZOOM

Abstract: In recent times philosophers of emotions have started investigating the role of anger, hatred, fear, and contempt in relation to racism and racial injustice. Envy, however, has been so far ignored. In this talk I start remedying this lacuna by asking what role group envy may play in racial relations. I suggest that different forms of malicious envy play a central role in anti-Asian racism, in particular, and explore the possibility that more benign forms of envy may drive positive, if limited, political change.
  • 1 octobre 2021 @ 10:00 – 12:00

John Hacker-Wright (University of Guelph)

Practical Wisdom as Knowledge of the Human Good

Où: Salle 0035 du Pavillon de l’aménagement (2940 Chem. de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine), Université de Montréal

Abstract: This paper concerns the idea of practical wisdom or phronēsis understood along the lines Aristotle presents it in Nicomachean Ethics Book VI. There he defines phronēsis through examining what is characteristic of the practically wise person, the phronimos: it is someone “able to deliberate correctly … about what sorts of things further living well as a whole (pros to eu zen holos)” (1140a25-27). Some scholars reject the idea that Aristotle advocates phronēsis as general knowledge concerning human life and contend that the knowledge of the phronimos is a contextual, perceptual sensitivity that prompts action. It is the capacity to get things right “occasion by occasion,” as John McDowell puts it. I will not be contesting this view as a reading of Aristotle, but I will argue that some of the philosophical objections to phronēsis as general knowledge can be set aside once we place that putative general knowledge in its proper context. The worry is that such general knowledge postulates phronēsis as a ‘blueprint’ for acting well that seems implausibly intellectual. On the blueprint model, phronēsis is a body of knowledge that is arrived at through an independent exercise of the intellect in which, for example, one takes a set of goods and contrives a manner of living that combines them optimally. A more plausible generalism is conceivable. The most general knowledge possessed by the phronimos is knowledge concerning what it is good to be doing over the most extended period. The progressive infinitive is important because the human good is a rational activity, a praxis meta logou, and one that is sustained throughout the whole of life. Without the emphatic progressive aspect, it is too easy to look at what good we might accomplish through the completion of our actions rather than the good we achieve in actively doing them. Hence, the justification that we have for pursuing one sort of life over another must consist of insight into the good of the activity itself rather than what results from doing it. Part of the knowledge of the phronimos is the thin yet important general knowledge of the best activity to engage in over the course of a lifetime, rather than an elaborate plan arrived at in advance or codified decision procedure that will optimize one’s achievement of the good.

  • 20 novembre 2021 @ 9:00 – 17:00 

2021 Workshop of the Canadian Society for Epistemology: How should we (and how did we) choose our logical theories?

Où: Salle C-2059, Carrefour des Arts et Sciences, Pavillon Lionel-Groulx (3150 rue Jean-Brillant), Université de Montréal

Speakers: Ole Hjortland  (University of Bergen), Dirk Schlimm  (McGill University), Mathieu Marion  (Université du Québec à Montréal), Greg Lavers  (Concordia University), Ulf Hlobil  (Concordia University)

  • 3 décembre 2021 @ 10:00 – 12:00

Miriam McCormick (University of Richmond)

Où: Salle  C-1017-02, Carrefour des Arts et Sciences, Pavillon Lionel-Groulx (3150 rue Jean-Brillant), Université de Montréal

Résumé/Abstract: In this talk, I argue that in many cases, there are good reasons to engage with people who hold fringe beliefs such as debunked conspiracy theories. I (1) discuss reasons for engaging with fringe beliefs; (2) discuss the conditions that need to be met for engagement to be worthwhile; (3) consider the question of how to engage with such beliefs, and defend what Jeremy Fantl has called “closed-minded engagement “and (4) address worries that such closed-minded engagement involves problematic deception or manipulation. Thinking about how we engage with irrational emotions offers a way of responding to these concerns. Reflection on engagement with fringe beliefs has wider implications for two distinct philosophical discussions. First, it can help illuminate the nature of beliefs, lending support to the view that not all states which are deeply resistant to evidence thereby fail to be beliefs. Second, an implication of the view I put forth is that it need not constitute a lack of respect to adopt what Peter Strawson called “the objective stance” in relationships.

  • 28 janvier 2022 @ 10:00 – 12:00

Michael Milona (Ryerson University)

Reasons for Perceptualism about Emotion

Présentation Zoom.

Résumé/Abstract: Perceptualism is the thesis that emotions are perceptual experiences of value. This paper explains how perceptualists should address one of the view’s most important and longstanding difficulties, which I call the normative assessability challenge. According to this challenge, perceptualism fails since while emotions are subject to assessment in terms of reasons and rationality, perceptual experiences are not. My solution comes in two parts. I first distinguish different types of normative assessment and argue that we lack strong grounds for holding that emotions are assessable in a way that paradigm sensory perceptual experiences are not. I next offer an argument for why it is a mistake, even independent of any commitment to perceptualism, to maintain that emotions are normatively assessable in a different way than sensory experiences. It turns out emotions are assessable only in a rather uninteresting way that even non-mental states can be.

  • 18 mars 2022 @ 10:00 – 12:00

David Thorstad (Oxford)

The zetetic turn and the procedural turn

Où/Where: Local C-1017-02, Carrefour des arts et des sciences, Université de Montréal, Pavillon Lionel-Groulx (3150, rue Jean-Brillant, Montréal, QC, H3T 1N8)

*La conférence sera aussi présentée sur Zoom. /The conference will also be presented on Zoom.
Abstract: Epistemology finds itself in the midst of a zetetic turn from the study of rational belief towards the study of rational inquiry. Herbert Simon called for a broader procedural turn in the study of bounded rationality away from attitudes and towards the processes of inquiry that produced them. In this paper, I ask what philosophers can learn about the zetetic turn in epistemology in light of its relationship to the procedural turn in bounded rationality. I discuss four concrete lessons: a distinction between two interpretations of the zetetic turn; a novel motivation for taking the zetetic turn; a dilemma for intellectualist accounts of the aim of inquiry; and the need for a second zetetic turn within practical philosophy.
  • 25 mars 2022 @ 13:30 – 15:30

Jack Kwong (Appalachian State University)

Despair and Hopelessness

Où/Where: Local C-1017-02, Carrefour des arts et des sciences, Université de Montréal, Pavillon Lionel-Groulx (3150, rue Jean-Brillant, Montréal, QC, H3T 1N8)

*La conférence sera aussi présentée sur Zoom. /The conference will also be presented on Zoom.

Abstract: It has recently been proposed that hope is polysemous in that it sometimes refers to hoping and other times, to being hopeful. That it has these two distinct senses is reflected in the fact that a person can hope for an outcome without necessarily being hopeful that it will occur. In this talk, I offer a new argument for this distinction. My strategy is to show that accepting it yields a rich account of two distinct ways in which hope can be lost or absent. Roughly, I argue that these two ways map onto the two senses of hope: A person can lose hope either by ceasing to hope for an outcome (hopelessness) or by ceasing to be hopeful that it will obtain (despair). Thinking about these negative attitudes in these two ways, I contend, is explanatorily rich, and fruitfully reveals how they differ in phenomenology, behavioral differences, and the ways in which a person can escape them.


 Ateliers/Workshops GRIN

  • 18 décembre 2020 @ 10:00 – 12:00
Table ronde: Perspectives on Well-Being
OÙ :Zoom

Le GRIN invite ses membres à une table ronde organisée par Pablo Gilabert, Mauro Rossi et Christine Tappolet sur le thème « Perspectives on Well-Being ». Deux textes seront discutés, un par Pablo Gilabert et un autre par Mauro Rossi et Christine Tappolet.

La lecture des deux textes au préalable est exigée. Pour obtenir les textes à lire ainsi que le lien zoom pour participer à la rencontre, il faut écrire à la coordonnatrice du CRÉ à l’adresse valery.giroux@umontreal.ca.
  • 19 février 2021 @ 10:00 – 11:30

Conférence GRIN: On the placebo effect

OÙ: Zoom

Présentation de Phoebe Friesen (McGill) au GRIN/CRÉ. Phoebe nous parlera de ses travaux entourant l’effet placebo.

  • 16 avril 2021 @10:00 – 12:00

Conférence GRIN/CRÉ: Anger and its desires

Présentation ZOOM de Laura Silva (Swiss Center for Affective Sciences).

Abstract: The orthodox view of anger takes desires for revenge or retribution to be central to the emotion. In this paper, I develop an empirically informed challenge to the retributive view of anger. In so doing, I argue that a distinct desire is central to anger: a desire for recognition. Desires for recognition aim at the targets of anger acknowledging the wrong they have committed, as opposed to aiming for their suffering. In light of the centrality of this desire for recognition, I argue that the retributive view of anger should be abandoned. I consider and dismiss two types of moves that can be made on the part of a proponent of the orthodox view in response to my argument. I propose that a pluralist view, which allows for both retribution and recognition in anger, is to be preferred, and conclude by considering some of my argument’s normative implications.

  • 14 – 16 mai 2021

Fittingness conference

Colloque organisé par Chris Howard (McGill) et Richard Rowland (Leeds).
Le colloque est ouvert aux membres du GRIN et du CRÉ, ainsi que leurs postdocs et chercheurs invités.
Pour s’inscrire ou pour plus d’infomations: chris.howard@mcgill.ca.

  • 19 mai 2021 @ 9:20-14:35

Workshop CRÉ/GRIN: Resilience in Action and Belief

Resilience is commonly understood as the ability that agents exhibit in stressful, uncertain, or challenging situations, when they ‘bounce back,’ adapt, and thrive despite adversity. This workshop is dedicated to a philosophical exploration of the epistemic and practical aspects of human resilience, in particular via the notions of grit, hope, and coping.

  • Semaine du 7 juin

École CRÉ/GRIN/SoPhA, sur le thème Éthique et rationalité.

Plus d’informations à venir.