(Plus de détails à venir/More details to come)
- 13 septembre 2019, 10h-12h
Raamy Majeed (Auckland) “Do Recalcitrant Emotions Show that Emotions are Modular?”
Salle/Room: 422, Stone Castle, Université de Montréal (2910 Édouard-Montpetit)
The occurrence of recalcitrant emotions, i.e. emotional episodes that are in conflict with our considered judgements, are used as unproblematic means of motivating the view that emotions are modular: roughly, that they are cognitive capacities which are explained by mental components functionally dissociable from other parts of the mind. In this paper, I argue that recalcitrant emotions don’t, by themselves, show that emotions are modular in a non-trivial sense.
- 20 septembre 2019, 10h-12h
Victoria McGeer (Princeton) “Empathy Internalized: On the scaffolding power of self-directed emotion.”
Salle/Room: Leacock 927, McGill University (855 Rue Sherbrooke Ouest)
It is commonly accepted that empathy plays a key role in moral agency. More deeply, it is often held to play a critical role in (adult) moral development by generating self-castigating emotions of guilt, shame and remorse when we are brought face to face with the wrongs we do to others. In defense of this commonsense view, I argue the self-castigating emotions can be epistemically valuable so far as they promote insight into our conduct and character that may be necessary for such development. But more problematically, these emotions can also be motivationally counterproductive for such development. To overcome this problem, I examine the conditions under which these self-castigating emotions can be managed, contained or metabolized, thereby supporting rather than defeating our self-development. My claim will be that forging an empathetic connection with our own erring self is an essential part of this developmental process.
- 27 septembre 2019, 10h-12h
Michael Titelbaum (Winsconsin-Madison) “The Logical Firmament”
Salle/Room: 422, Stone Castle, (2910 Édouard-Montpetit, Université de Montréal)
Most work in the epistemology of logic asks how inferential rules are known, and how individual steps in a proof are justified. But what happens when single steps are composed into a complex derivation? A new set of facts—“combinational facts”—come into play, which have been undertheorized despite being at the heart of such phenomena as logical non-omniscience. I will ask how recognition of these facts might alter our epistemology of logic. And I will make a tentative proposal for how combinational facts come to be known.
- 4 octobre 2019, pm: Hille Paakkunainen (Syracuse), invitée à Concordia
- 14-16 novembre : Knowledge in a digital world, Congress of the Canadian Society for Epistemology
- 22 novembre 2019: Workshop sur Being a Believer de David Hunter (Ryerson)