Le GRIN organise chaque semestre une série d’ateliers dans le cadre desquels ses membres ou encore des conférenciers invités présentent leurs travaux les plus récents. Ce programme est sujet à modification, donc veuillez visiter cette page fréquemment.
26 septembre, 2014, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: 307 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)
Michael Blome-Tillmann (University of Cambridge) “The Role of Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law”
3 octobre, 2014, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: 307 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)
Jill Rusin (Wilfrid Laurier University) “Epistemic Access and Culpable Ignorance”
Abstract:
Elizabeth Harman and Gideon Rosen disagree about whether moral ignorance exculpates. I examine their arguments and compare to a more moderate position, based on a ‘reasonable person’ interpretation of excusable ignorance. This view takes epistemic accessibility to be of significance to culpability. But I argue that a subject’s access needs to be assessed via relevant counterfactuals, not merely by narrow intuitions about ‘available evidence’, a suggestion motivated by looking at cases of ‘motivated ignorance’. This idea exposes what I take to be problematically artificial in how Harman and Rosen approach their disagreement: they stipulate adequate procedural management of the subjects’ beliefs as a background condition in cases they discuss. I find, however, that in certain significant cases, procedural mismanagement is explicable by the very reason that both explains the ignorance and makes it culpable.
17 octobre 2014, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: 422 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)
Hichem Naar (Université de Montréal), “The Significance of Quasi-Doxastic Attitudes”
Abstract:
This paper argues that there is class of attitudes, ‘quasi-doxastic attitudes’, which are belief-like in having conditions of correctness, but which are action-like in their relationship to reasoning and reasons, and discusses the significance of this fact for a recent debate about the nature of reasons for attitudes.
7 novembre 2014, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: 422 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)
Ulrike Heuer (University of Leeds), “Two Kinds of Wrong Reasons”
14 novembre 2014
Journée du GRIN: Normativité et Perception, organisé par Maxime Doyon
Salle: C-2059 (Pavillon Lionel-Groulx, 3150 rue Jean-Brillant, métro Université de Montréal)
12 décembre 2014, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: 422 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)
Mark van Roojen (University of Nebraska – Lincoln), “What you know when you
know what you’re talking about, morally speaking”
30 janvier 2015, 10 :00 – 12:00
Salle: 307 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)
Michele Palmira (Université de Montréal), “Outline of a new approach to epistemic peer disagreement”
Abstract:
The aim of this talk is to outline a new approach to the problem of epistemic peer disagreement. The main point is to argue for the compatibility between the idea that the epistemic significance of peer disagreement is the same in all cases and the view that the rational response to peer disagreement may vary depending on the specific case of disagreement.
20 février 2015, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: W-5215, Pavillon Thérèse-Casgrain (455 Boul. René-Lévesque E., métro Berri-UQAM) voir carte
27 mars 2015, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: Leacock 927 (855 rue Sherbrooke O., métro McGill) voir carte
John Brunero (University of Nebraska – Lincoln), “Intentions and the Bootstrapping Objection”