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Ateliers du GRIN 2013 -14

2013-2014

6 septembre, 2013, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: B-3260 (Pavillon 3200 rue Jean-Brillant, métro Université de Montréal)

Mark Lance (Georgetown University) Life is not a Box-Score: Lived Normativity, Abstract Evaluation, and the Is/Ought Distinction

 

8 novembre, 2013, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: 309 (2910 Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Adina Roskies (Dartmouth College) On Being a Causa Sui

 

29 novembre, 2013, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: C-2059 (Pavillon Lionel-Groulx, 3150 rue Jean-Brillant, métro Université de Montréal)

Oisín Deery (Université de Montréal) A Causal-Modeling Approach to Manipulation Arguments and Frankfurt Cases

 

10 janvier, 2014, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: C-2059 (Pavillon Lionel-Groulx, 3150 rue Jean-Brillant, métro Université de Montréal)

Paul Russell (UBC) Compatibilism and Moral Luck: Problem or Predicament?

 

31 janvier, 2014, 12:00 – 14:00

Salle: 307 (2910 Boul. Edouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Fabrice Teroni (University of Bern) Emotions and Fiction

Abstract:

An investigation into the nature of those emotions that are typically elicited by fictional works should be premised on an understanding of the relation that emotions bear to the mental states – perceptions, beliefs, episodes of imagining and so on – that provide them with their objects. After all, the question of the nature of our emotional responses to fiction is more in fact the question of the nature of the emotions elicited by our cognitive engagement with fiction. In the first part of my presentation, I shall offer reasons to think that the best way of understanding the relation at stake is the following one: an emotion is an evaluative attitude one takes towards the content provided by these other mental states.  In the process, I shall emphasize how an approach along these lines differs from well-known alternative accounts of the emotions and explain why it fosters an original understanding of the correctness conditions of emotions. This will provide the background for the second part in which I shall explore the impact of such an approach on some of the traditional issues surrounding affective responses to fiction. I shall more specifically be concerned with different types of emotions that are elicited by fiction as well as by the sorts of reasons one may have for them.

 

21 février, 2014

Journée du CRÉUM/GRIN:  Attitudes, values and environment (voir programme)

Salle: C-1017-02, Pavillon Lionel-Groulx, 3150 rue Jean-Brillant (métro université de Montréal)

Conférenciers invités: Gregory Mikkelson (McGill), Graham Oddie (Colorado at Boulder), Katie McShane (Colorado State), Mauro Rossi (UQAM), Christopher Kelly (independent scholar)

*Cet atelier est organisé par Antoine C.-Dussault et Christine Tappolet pour le CRÉUM et le GRIN.

 

28 février – 1 mars, 2014

Journées du GRIN:  normativité et survenance (voir programme)

Salle: C-2059 (Pavillon Lionel-Groulx, 3150 rue Jean-Brillant, métro Université de Montréal)

Conférenciers invités: Bartosz Brozek (Jagiellonian University), Gerald Harrison (Massey University), Carla Bagnoli (University of Modena), Daniel Laurier (Université de Montréal), Antonino Rotolo (University of Bologna), Brian McLaughlin (Rutgers)

*Cet atelier est rendu possible en partie par une subvention du CRSH partagée par Josée Brunet (Inst. de technologie Agro-Alimentaire, Sainte-Hyacinthe) et Daniel Laurier (Université de Montréal)

 

7 mars, 2013, 15:00 – 17:00 (en collaboration avec le département de philosophie de l’UQAM)

Salle:  W-5215 (Pavillon Thérèse-Casgrain, 455, boul. René-Lévesque Est, métro Berri-UQAM)

Michael Zimmerman (UNC-Greensboro) Ignorance as a Moral Excuse

 

21 mars, 2014

Journée du GRIN: symposium sur Rationality through Reasoning (2013) de John Broome

Salle: C3061 (Pavillon Lionel Groulx, 3150 rue Jean-Brillant, Métro Université de Montréal)

Conférenciers invités: John Broome (Oxford), Paul Boghossian (NYU), Andrew Reisner (McGill), Nadeem Hussain (Stanford)

Voir Programme

*Cette atelier est rendu possible en partie par une subvention du CRSH partagée par Josée Brunet (Inst. de technologie Agro-Alimentaire, Sainte-Hyacinthe) et Daniel Laurier (Université de Montréal)

 

4 avril, 2014, 10:00 – 12:00 ANNULÉE

Salle: 309 (2910 Boulevard Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Jill Rusin (Wilfred Laurier University) Epistemic Access and Culpable Ignorance

Abstract:

Elizabeth Harman and Gideon Rosen disagree about whether moral ignorance exculpates. I examine their arguments and compare to a more moderate position, based on a ‘reasonable person’ interpretation of excusable ignorance. This view takes epistemic accessibility to be of significance to culpability. But I argue that a subject’s access needs to be assessed via relevant counterfactuals, not merely by narrow intuitions about ‘available evidence’, a suggestion motivated by looking at cases of ‘motivated ignorance’. This idea exposes what I take to be problematically artificial in how Harman and Rosen approach their disagreement: they stipulate adequate procedural management of the subjects’ beliefs as a background condition in cases they discuss. I find, however, that in certain significant cases, procedural mismanagement is explicable by the very reason that both explains the ignorance and makes it culpable.

 

25 avril, 2014, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: C-2059 (Pavillon Lionel-Groulx, 3150 rue Jean-Brillant, métro Université de Montréal)

Matthew Chrisman (Univerisité d’Edinburg) Making up Our Minds and What We Ought to Believe

Abstract:

Two perennial views about doxastic agency and normativity come from the Cartesian (rationalist) picture, according to which forming beliefs is like other things we actively and, in the good case, rationally do, and the Humean (reliabilist) picture, according to which the mental is just part of the physiological, and belief states are very much like other physiological states in being indirectly and possibly rationally controllable but not actively acquired. In this paper, I explore some options towards a middle ground between: the BifurcatedAristotlean, Kantian, and Hegelian pictures. My ultimate goal is to defend a roughly Hegelian conception of doxastic agency that coheres with my antecedent views about epistemic normativity.

 

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