Années précédentes

2017-2018 Ateliers/Workshops

  • 20 oct. 2017 :

Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (Tufts University) “Value Ascriptions

10h-12h – Salle : 223 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Abstract:

This paper focuses on value as ascribed to what can be desired, enjoyed, cherished, admired, loved, and so on: value that putatively serves as ground for evaluating such attitudes and for justifying conduct. The main question of the paper is whether such value ascriptions are property ascriptions and why anyone would even think so. Given how the disagreement between cognitivists and non-cognitivists is traditionally construed within metaethics, the question concerns whether cognitivism provides the right approach to value ascriptions and what the basic motivation for that approach is. According to the philosophical lore, the structure of evaluative thought and language prima facie favors the cognitivist thesis that value ascriptions are property ascriptions. This paper rethinks the lessons to be drawn from the structure of evaluative thought and language. The paper does not take sides in the traditional debate between cognitivism and non-cognitivism but, instead, questions how the debate about the nature of value ascriptions has traditionally been framed.

 

  • 12 janv. 2018 :

Nomy Arpaly (Brown University) “On Benevolence

14h-16h – Salle DS-1950 (320, rue Sainte Catherine Est, UQÀM)

Abstract:

It is widely agreed that benevolence is not the whole of the moral life, but it is not as widely appreciated that benevolence is an irreducible part of that life. This paper argues that Kantian efforts to characterize benevolence, or something like it, in terms of reverence for rational agency fall short. Such reverence, while credibly an important part of the moral life, is no more the whole of it than benevolence.

 

  • 26 janv. 2018 :

Dale Dorsey (The University of Kansas) “Preferences and Prudential Reasons”

10h-12h –  223 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Abstract:
Preference-based theories of the personal good seem to face a problematic implication in cases of prudential choice.  It would seem to make little difference to the quality of a person’s life were they to achieve the content of their preferences rather than to simply direct their preferences toward that which already obtains.  If, for instance, Faith has the choice to simply sign the papers to become an astronaut (which she longs to do) or take a preference-altering pill such that she prefers to remain Earth-bound, a preference-based theory of the good seems to have no principled way to avoid the conclusion that it would be perfectly prudentially rational for Faith to simply flip a coin.  In this paper, I argue that this implication depends on two interpretive choices: first, the interpretation of a preference-based theory of the good and, second, the interpretation of prudential reasons and prudential rationality.  I argue that these interpretations are not forced, and that interpreting them in a way that avoids this problematic neutrality is defensible.

 

  • 9 fév. 2018 :

Ralph Wedgwood (University of Southern California) The Measurement of Value”

10h-12h – Salle 223 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Abstract: 

When one state of affairs A is in a way better than another state of affairs B, does it make sense to inquire how much better A is in this way than B? Is goodness amenable to any kind of cardinal measurement?

In the utilitarian tradition, it sometimes seems implicitly assumed that goodness is amenable to the same kind of extensive measurement as quantities like mass or volume. According to this assumption, goodness is like a kind of stuff, and inquiring how good the world is as a whole is like inquiring about the total mass or volume of this stuff in the world as a whole. It will be argued here this assumption is open to grave objections.

An alternative account is suggested. First, there is reason to think that goodness can be measured on an interval scale (not a ratio scale). Goodness seems to form a difference structure: we can meaningfully say, not only that one state of affairs is better than another, but also that the first state is “much better” or “slightly better” than the other. In other words, we can compare differences in value between pairs of states of affairs.

Secondly, the best explanation of this lies in a fundamental connection between value and probability. In effect, it is part of the job description of a value that it should play nicely with probability functions. Every value is capable of interacting with every probability function to provide a corresponding notion of expected value (according to that probability function). This requires that the value must have the kind of quantitative structure that can be captured by an interval scale.

 

  • 23 mars 2018 :

Ulf Hlobil (Concordia University)  On Weighing Reasons with Defeaters”

10h-12h – 223 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Abstract:

According to the Reasoning View about normative reasons, R is a normative reason to φ just in case R can figure as a premise in good reasoning that results in φ-ing. As is widely recognized among advocates of the Reasoning View (e.g. Setiya, Way, Asarnow), the most important challenge for the Reasoning View is to give an account of how reasons can be outweighed. It is also widely recognized that this is best done by appeal to the defeasibility of reasoning. After introducing the Reasoning View, I start by criticizing different accounts of weights in terms of defeasibility. I then offer my own account of the weights in terms of defeasibility. A crucial feature of the account is that it distinguishes premises of practical reasoning from background attitudes. Along the way, I introduce notions of enablers, obligations, and virtuous action. I end by suggesting that the “objective ought” and “objective reasons” are idealizations, and that the “subjective ought” and “subjective reasons” are primary.

 

  • 14 mai 2018 :

Jonathan Way (University of Southampton)

 “The Distinctiveness of Fittingness”  (Co-authored with Conor McHugh)

15h-17h : Room S-201, S Annex (2145 Mackay), Sir George Williams Campus, Concordia University

 

According to fitting-attitudes accounts of value, evaluative properties are to be analysed in terms of what’s fitting to value – e.g. the admirable is what’s fitting to admire, the delightful is what’s fitting to delight in, the loathsome is what’s fitting to loathe. Such accounts raise the question of what it is to be fitting to value something. While some proponents of fitting-attitudes accounts analyse fittingness in terms of reasons, obligations, or permissibility, others have suggested that fittingness is a distinctive and unanalysable normative property.

This paper defends this latter view. We proceed by noting three marks of fittingness: that incentives for attitudes do not bear on their fittingness, that fitting is stronger than permissibility but weaker than obligation, and that absences of attitudes cannot be fitting. We argue that these marks allow us to distinguish fittingness from other normative properties and cast doubt on the prospects of analysing fittingness in other normative terms. The upshot is support not only for fitting-attitude accounts of value but for fitting-attitude accounts of other normative properties too.

 

2016-2017 Journées

15 mai, 2017

Salle: 422 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Attitudes, Rationality and Concepts

16-17 mars, 2017

Salle: A-2407 (Université de Montréal, Pavillon Maximilien-Caron, 3101 chemin de la tour)

L’Esprit et les Valeurs, Journées du GRIN

23 février, 2017

Salle: Salle C-2059 (Carrefour des Arts et des Sciences, UdeM, 3150 Rue Jean-Brillant)

Bien être, Normativité et “Bien pour”

10 nov., 2016,

Salle: 0040, (Pavillon d’aménagement, 2940 Chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine, UdeM)

Nouvelles Perspectives sur la Duperie de Soi

 29-30 sept., 2016,

Salle: C-3061 (Carrefour des Sciences, UdeM)

Time and Intentionality, International Conference

Ateliers/workshops 2016-2017 :

(liste)

25 septembre, 2015, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: 927 (Pavillon Leacock, Université McGill, métros Peel ou McGill)

Miriam McCormick (University of Richmond), Are constitutive norms normative?
Résumé: In the current debate about which norm governs belief – truth, knowledge, justification, or something else, what is most often in question is which is the constitutive norm, namely what norm do we uncover when thinking about the nature of belief, what a belief is. I argue that answering the question of whether a belief is permissible, or appropriate, sometimes requires going beyond what can be discovered by appeal to constitutive norms, and I suggest that it will likely take us into the practical and moral domain.

 

13 novembre, 2015, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: 223 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

David Hunter (Ryerson University), Virtuous inferences and virtuous thinkers (Or, sweeping away Broome’s dispositions)
Résumé: Following Aristotle, John Broome claims that a mental transition is an inference only if it flows from a prior disposition to perform such transitions. Without the disposition the transition would be passive like digestion as opposed to active like eating. But this comparison and contrast are misleading. Eating, but not reasoning, involves various means and different parts, can be done with a purpose and from a motive, and can be voluntary. And digestion is something that a person does, not something—like muscular cellular mitosis—that merely happens inside her. But whereas digestion is merely contingently involuntary, reasoning is essentially involuntary. What makes a transition an inference, I argue, are the explanatory links connecting the beliefs involved in it and what makes it active is the self-awareness characteristic of activity.

 

20 novembre, 2015, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: W-5215 (455 Blvd René-Lévesque E, UQÀM, métro Berri-UQÀM)

Jason Bridges (University of Chicago), Against choice
Résumé: Contemporary philosophers tend to take for granted that fundamental questions about the nature and structure of practical rationality are appropriately framed in terms of the concept of choice among alternatives. Thus, for example, the debate between maximalist and satisfactionist theories of rational requirements presupposes that the business of requirements of rationality is to govern the agent’s selection of an action from amongst a set of available options. I argue against this orientation. The concept that structures practical rationality at the most basic level is not choosing but acting, not selecting A over B, but, simply, doing A, and recognizing that this is so has important implications for how we understand our capacity to respond to reasons for action. I elucidate and defend this claim through a consideration of the teleological character of practical reasons, and then briefly sketch its implications both for the topic of rational requirements and for questions about the nature of the will recently brought to attention by Joseph Raz.

 

11 décembre 2015, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: Université Concordia, Henry F. Hall Building, H-1220

Patrick Rysiew (University of Victoria), Practical Bases, Binding Norms, Constitutive Aims
This paper considers Hilary Kornblith’s (1993, 2002) suggestion that epistemic norms have “a practical basis”. I argue that Kornblith’s view withstands many of the objections that have been made against it, and that it constitutes an improvement over certain other views that seek to ground epistemic normativity in considerations of value. But it doesn’t do everything: while they may be an essential part of the story, practical considerations alone don’t fully explain epistemic norms and their basis. In addition, Kornblith’s proposal requires, and seems to presume, ideas associated with accounts often thought to be competitors to the kind of view Kornblith endorses. However, while this may show that Kornblith’s view is incomplete, it doesn’t show that it’s incorrect. This, because Kornblith’s approach and the idea (for example) that belief as such is governed by certain norms needn’t be competing; in fact, they may be interestingly complementary.

 

8 janvier 2016, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: UQÀM, 455 Blvd René-Lévesque E, local W-5215

Shaun Nichols (University of Arizona), Rational learners and moral rules
Philosophical observation and psychological studies indicate that people draw subtle distinctions in the normative domain. But it remains unclear exactly what gives rise to such distinctions. On one prominent approach, emotion systems trigger non-utilitarian judgments. The main alternative, inspired by Chomskyan linguistics, suggests that moral distinctions derive from an innate moral grammar. In this paper, we develop a rational learning account. We argue that the “size principle”, which is implicated in word learning (Xu & Tenenbaum 2007), can also explain how children would use scant and equivocal evidence to interpret candidate rules as applying more narrowly than utilitarian rules.

***ANNULÉ*** – 5 février 2016, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: Université de Montréal, 2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, local 223

Frédérique de Vignemont (Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris), A narcissistic conception of the sense of bodily ownership
Résumé: Cette conférence est annulée.

 

18 mars 2016, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: Université McGill, pavillon Leacock, local 927

Julia Markovits (Cornell), On What It Is To Matter
Résumé: Derek Parfit worries that Subjectivism about what matters – the view that our reasons for acting depend in some way on facts about what we desire – entails a bleak and nihilistic picture of the normative world.  He argues that we’re misled into accepting Subjectivism by a series of considerations, none of which actually support the view, though they may at first appear to.  Understanding why many of us believe Subjectivism will, he thinks, debunk that belief.

I will argue that Parfit’s debunking arguments are less debunking than he thinks, and indeed supply a way in to what is missing from his discussion: a sketch of the some stronger arguments for a subjectivist theory of reasons.  Subjectivism is, moreover, not as bleak a view as Parfit fears; and indeed, I will argue, Parfit’s own conciliatory ambitions for moral philosophy should make him much more sympathetic to the subjectivist project than he is.

 

2015 – 16

26 septembre, 2014, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: 307 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Michael Blome-Tillmann (University of Cambridge) « The Role of Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law »

 

3 octobre, 2014, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: 307 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Jill Rusin (Wilfrid Laurier University) « Epistemic Access and Culpable Ignorance »

Abstract:

Elizabeth Harman and Gideon Rosen disagree about whether moral ignorance exculpates. I examine their arguments and compare to a more moderate position, based on a ‘reasonable person’ interpretation of excusable ignorance. This view takes epistemic accessibility to be of significance to culpability. But I argue that a subject’s access needs to be assessed via relevant counterfactuals, not merely by narrow intuitions about ‘available evidence’, a suggestion motivated by looking at cases of ‘motivated ignorance’. This idea exposes what I take to be problematically artificial in how Harman and Rosen approach their disagreement: they stipulate adequate procedural management of the subjects’ beliefs as a background condition in cases they discuss. I find, however, that in certain significant cases, procedural mismanagement is explicable by the very reason that both explains the ignorance and makes it culpable.

 

17 octobre 2014, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: 422 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Hichem Naar (Université de Montréal), « The Significance of Quasi-Doxastic Attitudes »

Abstract:

This paper argues that there is class of attitudes, ‘quasi-doxastic attitudes’, which are belief-like in having conditions of correctness, but which are action-like in their relationship to reasoning and reasons, and discusses the significance of this fact for a recent debate about the nature of reasons for attitudes.

 

7 novembre 2014, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: 422 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Ulrike Heuer (University of Leeds), « Two Kinds of Wrong Reasons »

 

14 novembre 2014

Journée du GRIN: Normativité et Perception, organisé par Maxime Doyon

Salle: c-2059 (Pavillon Lionel-Groulx, 3150 rue Jean-Brillant, métro Université de Montréal)

voir programme

 

12 décembre 2014, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: 422 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Mark van Roojen (University of Nebraska – Lincoln) « What you know when you
know what you’re talking about, morally speaking
 »

 

30 janvier 2014, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: 307 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Michele Palmira (Université de Montréal) « Outline of a new approach to epistemic peer disagreement »

Abstract:

The aim of this talk is to outline a new approach to the problem of epistemic peer disagreement. The main point is to argue for the compatibility between the idea that the epistemic significance of peer disagreement is the same in all cases and the view that the rational response to peer disagreement may vary depending on the specific case of disagreement.

 

20 février 2015, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: W-5215, Pavillon Thérèse-Casgrain (455 Boul. René-Lévesque E., métro Berri-UQAM) voir carte

Marya Schechtman (University of Illinois at Chicago), « Loving Eyes of my Own: Practical Necessity, Individuality and Value »

 

27 mars 2015, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: Leacock 927 (855 rue Sherbrooke O., métro McGill) voir carte

John Brunero (University of Nebraska – Lincoln) « Intentions and the Bootstrapping Objection »

 

24 avril 2015, 10:00 – 12:00 (ANNULÉ)

Salle: W-5215, Pavillon Thérèse-Casgrain (455 Boul. René-Lévesque E., métro Berri-UQAM) voir carte

John Turri (University of Waterloo), titre à confirmer

 

30 avril, 1 mai 2015

Journées du GRIN: Normativité et Métaéthique, organisé Hichem Naar, Michele Palmira et Christine Tappolet, en collaboration avec le CRÉ

Salle: 307 et 422, 2910 boulevard Edouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal

voir programme

2014 – 15

26 septembre, 2014, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: 307 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Michael Blome-Tillmann (University of Cambridge) “The Role of Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law”

 

3 octobre, 2014, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: 307 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Jill Rusin (Wilfrid Laurier University) “Epistemic Access and Culpable Ignorance”

Abstract:

Elizabeth Harman and Gideon Rosen disagree about whether moral ignorance exculpates. I examine their arguments and compare to a more moderate position, based on a ‘reasonable person’ interpretation of excusable ignorance. This view takes epistemic accessibility to be of significance to culpability. But I argue that a subject’s access needs to be assessed via relevant counterfactuals, not merely by narrow intuitions about ‘available evidence’, a suggestion motivated by looking at cases of ‘motivated ignorance’. This idea exposes what I take to be problematically artificial in how Harman and Rosen approach their disagreement: they stipulate adequate procedural management of the subjects’ beliefs as a background condition in cases they discuss. I find, however, that in certain significant cases, procedural mismanagement is explicable by the very reason that both explains the ignorance and makes it culpable.

 

17 octobre 2014, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: 422 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Hichem Naar (Université de Montréal), “The Significance of Quasi-Doxastic Attitudes”

Abstract:

This paper argues that there is class of attitudes, ‘quasi-doxastic attitudes’, which are belief-like in having conditions of correctness, but which are action-like in their relationship to reasoning and reasons, and discusses the significance of this fact for a recent debate about the nature of reasons for attitudes.

 

7 novembre 2014, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: 422 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Ulrike Heuer (University of Leeds), “Two Kinds of Wrong Reasons”

 

14 novembre 2014

Journée du GRIN: Normativité et Perception, organisé par Maxime Doyon

Salle: c-2059 (Pavillon Lionel-Groulx, 3150 rue Jean-Brillant, métro Université de Montréal)

voir programme

 

12 décembre 2014, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: 422 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Mark van Roojen (University of Nebraska – Lincoln) “What you know when you
know what you’re talking about, morally speaking

 

30 janvier 2014, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: 307 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Michele Palmira (Université de Montréal) “Outline of a new approach to epistemic peer disagreement

Abstract:

The aim of this talk is to outline a new approach to the problem of epistemic peer disagreement. The main point is to argue for the compatibility between the idea that the epistemic significance of peer disagreement is the same in all cases and the view that the rational response to peer disagreement may vary depending on the specific case of disagreement.

 

20 février 2015, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: W-5215, Pavillon Thérèse-Casgrain (455 Boul. René-Lévesque E., métro Berri-UQAM) voir carte

Marya Schechtman (University of Illinois at Chicago), “Loving Eyes of my Own: Practical Necessity, Individuality and Value”

 

27 mars 2015, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: Leacock 927 (855 rue Sherbrooke O., métro McGill) voir carte

John Brunero (University of Nebraska – Lincoln) “Intentions and the Bootstrapping Objection”

 

24 avril 2015, 10:00 – 12:00 (ANNULÉ)

Salle: W-5215, Pavillon Thérèse-Casgrain (455 Boul. René-Lévesque E., métro Berri-UQAM) voir carte

John Turri (University of Waterloo), titre à confirmer

 

30 avril, 1 mai 2015

Journées du GRIN: Normativité et Métaéthique, organisé Hichem Naar, Michele Palmira et Christine Tappolet, en collaboration avec le CRÉ

Salle: 307 et 422, 2910 boulevard Edouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal

voir programme

2013 – 2014

6 septembre, 2013

Mark Lance (Georgetown University) Life is not a Box-Score: Lived Normativity, Abstract Evaluation, and the Is/Ought Distinction

8 novembre, 2013

Adina Roskies (Dartmouth College) On Being a Causa Sui

29 novembre, 2013

Oisín Deery (Université de Montréal) A Causal-Modeling Approach to Manipulation Arguments and Frankfurt Cases

10 janvier, 2014

Paul Russell (UBC) Compatibilism and Moral Luck: Problem or Predicament?

 31 janvier, 2014

Fabrice Teroni (University of Bern) Emotions and Fiction

21 février, 2014

Journée du CRÉUM/GRIN: Attitudes, values and environment (voir programme)

Conférenciers invités: Gregory Mikkelson (McGill), Graham Oddie (Colorado at Boulder), Katie McShane (Colorado State), Mauro Rossi (UQAM), Christopher Kelly (independent scholar)

*Cet atelier est organisé par Antoine C.-Dussault et Christine Tappolet pour le CRÉUM et le GRIN.

 28 février – 1 mars, 2014

Journées du GRIN: normativité et survenance (voir programme)

Conférenciers invités: Bartosz Brozek (Jagiellonian University), Gerald Harrison (Massey University), Carla Bagnoli (University of Modena), Daniel Laurier (Université de Montréal), Antonino Rotolo (University of Bologna), Brian McLaughlin (Rutgers)

*Cet atelier est rendu possible en partie par une subvention du CRSH partagée par Josée Brunet (Inst. de technologie Agro-Alimentaire, Sainte-Hyacinthe) et Daniel Laurier (Université de Montréal)

 7 mars, 2014

(en collaboration avec le département de philosophie de l’UQAM)

Michael Zimmerman (UNC-Greensboro) Ignorance as a Moral Excuse 

 21 mars, 2014

Journée du GRIN: Symposium sur Rationality through Reasoning (2013) de John Broome (voir programme)

Conférenciers invités: John Broome (Oxford), Paul Boghossian (NYU), Andrew Reisner (McGill), Nadeem Hussain (Stanford)

*Cette atelier est rendu possible en partie par une subvention du CRSH partagée par Josée Brunet (Inst. de technologie Agro-Alimentaire, Sainte-Hyacinthe) et Daniel Laurier (Université de Montréal)

 25 avril, 2014

Matthew Chrisman (Univerisité d’Edinburg) Making up Our Minds and What We Ought to Believe

12 – 13 mai, 2014

Symposium SPQ 2014 – La normativité: découverte ou invention ? (voir programme)

* Ce symposium fut organisé par Sébastien Laliberté et David Rocheleau-Houle.

 

2012 – 2013

1 février, 2013

Mark Nelson (Westmount College) What the Utilitarian Cannot Think

22 mars, 2013

Selim Berker (Harvard) Does Evolutionary Psychology Show That Reasons for Action Are Mind-Dependent?

19 avril, 2013

Martin Gibert (McGill) Perception et progrès moral

17 mai, 2013

Journée du GRIN: Normativity and Attitudes

Conférenciers invités:

13 juin, 2013

Chrisoula Andreou (University of Utah) Parity, Comparability, and Choice

2011 – 2012

11 novembre, 2011

Nigel DeSouza (Ottawa), Pre-reflective ethical know-how

25 novembre, 2011

Jérôme Dokic (EHESS), On the Very Idea of Moral Perception

16 mars, 2012

Aude Bandini (CRÉUM et UQÀM), La dérive de la croyance

13 avril, 2012

Constantine Sandis (Oxford Brookes University), Action in Ethics

26 avril, 2012

Colloque: Les journées de la métaéthique. Joseph Heath (Université de Toronto), Ruwen Ogien (CNRS, Paris), Christine Tappolet (Université de Montréal)

 

2010 – 2011

8 octobre, 2010

Terence Cuneo (University of Vermont), Moral Realism: Substance and Strategy

5 novembre, 2010

Michael Blome-Tillmann (McGill University), Some Thoughts on Epistemic Justification and Reliability

26 novembre, 2010

Table ronde du GRIN : “Moral Aggregation”, d’Iwao Hirose (McGill University) avec Peter Dietsch (Université de Montréal) Tyler Doggett (University of Vermont) Mauro Rossi (UQÀM) Sarah Stroud (McGill University)

14 janvier, 2011

Asbjørn Steglich-Peterson (University of Aarhus),  Luck and Normativity

4 février, 2011

Martin Peterson (Eindhoven University of Technology),  Multi-dimensional Consequentialism

25 mars, 2011

Adam Morton (University of Alberta), Conventional Norms of Reasoning

15 avril, 2011

Abe Roth (Ohio State University), Reasons at hand and second hand

10 – 11 mai, 2011

Symposium SPQ 2011 – Normativité et relativisme (voir programme)

 

2009 – 2010

2 octobre, 2009

Michael Zimmerman (North Carolina, Greensboro), Partiality and Intrinsic Value

9 octobre, 2009

Iwao Hirose (McGill), Choosing what is Rational

23 octobre, 2009

Stéphane Lemaire (Rennes), Reconstruire le concept de responsabilité

27 octobre, 2009

John Broome (Oxford), Instrumental Rationality

27 novembre, 2009

Victoria McGeer (Princeton), Co-reactive attitudes and the making of moral community

11 décembre, 2009

Daniel Star (Boston), Two Levels of Moral Thinking

20 mars, 2010

Jonas Olson (Stockholm) Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism

12 – 14 mai, 2010

Symposium SPQ, La normativité et la nature humaine (voir programme)

*Ce symposium fut organisé par Patrick Turmel, Benoît Dubreuil et Christine Tappolet.

mai, 2010

Symposium CPA, Knowledge, Belief, and Normativity (voir programme)

* Ce symposium fut organisé par Yves Bouchard.