2021-2022
- 24 septembre 2021 @ 10:00 – 11:30
Sara Potrasi (University of Puget Sound)
Envy and Prejudice: The Role of Envy in a Racially Divided Public Sphere
Présentation ZOOM
- 1 octobre 2021 @ 10:00 – 12:00
John Hacker-Wright (University of Guelph)
Practical Wisdom as Knowledge of the Human Good
Où: Salle 0035 du Pavillon de l’aménagement (2940 Chem. de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine), Université de Montréal
Abstract: This paper concerns the idea of practical wisdom or phronēsis understood along the lines Aristotle presents it in Nicomachean Ethics Book VI. There he defines phronēsis through examining what is characteristic of the practically wise person, the phronimos: it is someone “able to deliberate correctly … about what sorts of things further living well as a whole (pros to eu zen holos)” (1140a25-27). Some scholars reject the idea that Aristotle advocates phronēsis as general knowledge concerning human life and contend that the knowledge of the phronimos is a contextual, perceptual sensitivity that prompts action. It is the capacity to get things right “occasion by occasion,” as John McDowell puts it. I will not be contesting this view as a reading of Aristotle, but I will argue that some of the philosophical objections to phronēsis as general knowledge can be set aside once we place that putative general knowledge in its proper context. The worry is that such general knowledge postulates phronēsis as a ‘blueprint’ for acting well that seems implausibly intellectual. On the blueprint model, phronēsis is a body of knowledge that is arrived at through an independent exercise of the intellect in which, for example, one takes a set of goods and contrives a manner of living that combines them optimally. A more plausible generalism is conceivable. The most general knowledge possessed by the phronimos is knowledge concerning what it is good to be doing over the most extended period. The progressive infinitive is important because the human good is a rational activity, a praxis meta logou, and one that is sustained throughout the whole of life. Without the emphatic progressive aspect, it is too easy to look at what good we might accomplish through the completion of our actions rather than the good we achieve in actively doing them. Hence, the justification that we have for pursuing one sort of life over another must consist of insight into the good of the activity itself rather than what results from doing it. Part of the knowledge of the phronimos is the thin yet important general knowledge of the best activity to engage in over the course of a lifetime, rather than an elaborate plan arrived at in advance or codified decision procedure that will optimize one’s achievement of the good.
- 20 novembre 2021 @ 9:00 – 17:00
2021 Workshop of the Canadian Society for Epistemology: How should we (and how did we) choose our logical theories?
Où: Salle C-2059, Carrefour des Arts et Sciences, Pavillon Lionel-Groulx (3150 rue Jean-Brillant), Université de Montréal
Speakers: Ole Hjortland (University of Bergen), Dirk Schlimm (McGill University), Mathieu Marion (Université du Québec à Montréal), Greg Lavers (Concordia University), Ulf Hlobil (Concordia University)
- 3 décembre 2021 @ 10:00 – 12:00
Miriam McCormick (University of Richmond)
Où: Salle C-1017-02, Carrefour des Arts et Sciences, Pavillon Lionel-Groulx (3150 rue Jean-Brillant), Université de Montréal
Résumé/Abstract: In this talk, I argue that in many cases, there are good reasons to engage with people who hold fringe beliefs such as debunked conspiracy theories. I (1) discuss reasons for engaging with fringe beliefs; (2) discuss the conditions that need to be met for engagement to be worthwhile; (3) consider the question of how to engage with such beliefs, and defend what Jeremy Fantl has called “closed-minded engagement “and (4) address worries that such closed-minded engagement involves problematic deception or manipulation. Thinking about how we engage with irrational emotions offers a way of responding to these concerns. Reflection on engagement with fringe beliefs has wider implications for two distinct philosophical discussions. First, it can help illuminate the nature of beliefs, lending support to the view that not all states which are deeply resistant to evidence thereby fail to be beliefs. Second, an implication of the view I put forth is that it need not constitute a lack of respect to adopt what Peter Strawson called “the objective stance” in relationships.
- 28 janvier 2022 @ 10:00 – 12:00
Michael Milona (Ryerson University)
Reasons for Perceptualism about Emotion
Présentation Zoom.
Résumé/Abstract: Perceptualism is the thesis that emotions are perceptual experiences of value. This paper explains how perceptualists should address one of the view’s most important and longstanding difficulties, which I call the normative assessability challenge. According to this challenge, perceptualism fails since while emotions are subject to assessment in terms of reasons and rationality, perceptual experiences are not. My solution comes in two parts. I first distinguish different types of normative assessment and argue that we lack strong grounds for holding that emotions are assessable in a way that paradigm sensory perceptual experiences are not. I next offer an argument for why it is a mistake, even independent of any commitment to perceptualism, to maintain that emotions are normatively assessable in a different way than sensory experiences. It turns out emotions are assessable only in a rather uninteresting way that even non-mental states can be.
- 18 mars 2022 @ 10:00 – 12:00
David Thorstad (Oxford)
The zetetic turn and the procedural turn
Où/Where: Local C-1017-02, Carrefour des arts et des sciences, Université de Montréal, Pavillon Lionel-Groulx (3150, rue Jean-Brillant, Montréal, QC, H3T 1N8)
- 25 mars 2022 @ 13:30 – 15:30
Jack Kwong (Appalachian State University)
Despair and Hopelessness
Où/Where: Local C-1017-02, Carrefour des arts et des sciences, Université de Montréal, Pavillon Lionel-Groulx (3150, rue Jean-Brillant, Montréal, QC, H3T 1N8)
*La conférence sera aussi présentée sur Zoom. /The conference will also be presented on Zoom.
Abstract: It has recently been proposed that hope is polysemous in that it sometimes refers to hoping and other times, to being hopeful. That it has these two distinct senses is reflected in the fact that a person can hope for an outcome without necessarily being hopeful that it will occur. In this talk, I offer a new argument for this distinction. My strategy is to show that accepting it yields a rich account of two distinct ways in which hope can be lost or absent. Roughly, I argue that these two ways map onto the two senses of hope: A person can lose hope either by ceasing to hope for an outcome (hopelessness) or by ceasing to be hopeful that it will obtain (despair). Thinking about these negative attitudes in these two ways, I contend, is explanatorily rich, and fruitfully reveals how they differ in phenomenology, behavioral differences, and the ways in which a person can escape them.
2020-2021
Ateliers/Workshops GRIN
- 18 décembre 2020 @ 10:00 – 12:00
Le GRIN invite ses membres à une table ronde organisée par Pablo Gilabert, Mauro Rossi et Christine Tappolet sur le thème « Perspectives on Well-Being ». Deux textes seront discutés, un par Pablo Gilabert et un autre par Mauro Rossi et Christine Tappolet.
- 19 février 2021 @ 10:00 – 11:30
Conférence GRIN: On the placebo effect
OÙ: Zoom
Présentation de Phoebe Friesen (McGill) au GRIN/CRÉ. Phoebe nous parlera de ses travaux entourant l’effet placebo.
- 16 avril 2021 @10:00 – 12:00
Conférence GRIN/CRÉ: Anger and its desires
Présentation ZOOM de Laura Silva (Swiss Center for Affective Sciences).
Abstract: The orthodox view of anger takes desires for revenge or retribution to be central to the emotion. In this paper, I develop an empirically informed challenge to the retributive view of anger. In so doing, I argue that a distinct desire is central to anger: a desire for recognition. Desires for recognition aim at the targets of anger acknowledging the wrong they have committed, as opposed to aiming for their suffering. In light of the centrality of this desire for recognition, I argue that the retributive view of anger should be abandoned. I consider and dismiss two types of moves that can be made on the part of a proponent of the orthodox view in response to my argument. I propose that a pluralist view, which allows for both retribution and recognition in anger, is to be preferred, and conclude by considering some of my argument’s normative implications.
- 14 – 16 mai 2021
Fittingness conference
Colloque organisé par Chris Howard (McGill) et Richard Rowland (Leeds).
Le colloque est ouvert aux membres du GRIN et du CRÉ, ainsi que leurs postdocs et chercheurs invités.
Pour s’inscrire ou pour plus d’infomations: chris.howard@mcgill.ca.
- 19 mai 2021 @ 9:20-14:35
Workshop CRÉ/GRIN: Resilience in Action and Belief
Resilience is commonly understood as the ability that agents exhibit in stressful, uncertain, or challenging situations, when they ‘bounce back,’ adapt, and thrive despite adversity. This workshop is dedicated to a philosophical exploration of the epistemic and practical aspects of human resilience, in particular via the notions of grit, hope, and coping.
2019-2020
Ateliers/Workshops GRIN
- 13 septembre 2019, 10h-12h.
Raamy Majeed (Auckland) “Do Recalcitrant Emotions Show that Emotions are Modular?”
Salle/Room: 422, Stone Castle, Université de Montréal (2910 Édouard-Montpetit)
Résumé/Abstract:
The occurrence of recalcitrant emotions, i.e. emotional episodes that are in conflict with our considered judgements, are used as unproblematic means of motivating the view that emotions are modular: roughly, that they are cognitive capacities which are explained by mental components functionally dissociable from other parts of the mind. In this paper, I argue that recalcitrant emotions don’t, by themselves, show that emotions are modular in a non-trivial sense.
- 20 septembre 2019, 10h-12h.
Victoria McGeer (Princeton) “Empathy Internalized: On the scaffolding power of self-directed emotion.”
Salle/Room: Leacock 927, McGill University (855 Rue Sherbrooke Ouest)
Résumé/Abstract:
It is commonly accepted that empathy plays a key role in moral agency. More deeply, it is often held to play a critical role in (adult) moral development by generating self-castigating emotions of guilt, shame and remorse when we are brought face to face with the wrongs we do to others. In defense of this commonsense view, I argue the self-castigating emotions can be epistemically valuable so far as they promote insight into our conduct and character that may be necessary for such development. But more problematically, these emotions can also be motivationally counterproductive for such development. To overcome this problem, I examine the conditions under which these self-castigating emotions can be managed, contained or metabolized, thereby supporting rather than defeating our self-development. My claim will be that forging an empathetic connection with our own erring self is an essential part of this developmental process.
- 27 septembre 2019, 10h-12h.
Michael Titelbaum (Winsconsin-Madison) “The Logical Firmament”
Salle/Room: 422, Stone Castle, (2910 Édouard-Montpetit, Université de Montréal)
Résumé/Abstract:
Most work in the epistemology of logic asks how inferential rules are known, and how individual steps in a proof are justified. But what happens when single steps are composed into a complex derivation? A new set of facts—“combinational facts”—come into play, which have been undertheorized despite being at the heart of such phenomena as logical non-omniscience. I will ask how recognition of these facts might alter our epistemology of logic. And I will make a tentative proposal for how combinational facts come to be known.
- 1er octobre 2019, 15h-17h.
Hille Paakkunainen (Syracuse), invitée à Concordia. “Virtue and Practical Inference” | Concordia Philosophy Speaker Series
In this talk, Dr. Hille Paakkunainen will argue that virtues of character are dispositions of practical inference, and that neo-Humean belief-desire psychology is inadequate to account for them.
KEYNOTE SPEAKERS:
Karen Frost-Arnold (Hobart and William Smith Colleges) J. Adam Carter (University of Glasgow)
The digital age poses new challenges for epistemology. Digital technologies have become central to how we form, revise, and maintain our beliefs. How should we approach this recent development as epistemologists? What is the epistemological significance of our increasing reliance on, e.g., anonymous online sources, social media, personalized news feeds and search engines? What does the widespread use of AI and opaque algorithms mean for our lives as knowers, testifiers, and reasoners? Do new epistemic responsibilities arise in the digital world? How can we, as epistemologists, contribute to making sense of these developments?
- 22 novembre 2019, 10h-16h.
Workshop sur On Being a Believer de David Hunter (Ryerson)
Salle/Room: A-2407, pavillon Maximilien-Caron, Université de Montréal (3101, chemin de la tour, Montréal, Qc.)
Résumé/Abstract: This book is about being a believer, about having a cognitive perspective on the world.
- 10 janvier 2020, 10h-12h.
Kate Nolfi (Vermont) – GRIN/Thème phare éthique féministe
Salle/Room: W-5215, 5e étage Pavillon Thérèse-Casgrain (W), UQAM (455, Boulevard René-Lévesque Est)
- 6 février 2020, 17h – 19h.
5 à 7 du GRIN/CRÉ
Brasserie Saint-Hublon, 5414 Gatineau, Montréal, H3T 1X5
Le GRIN et le CRÉ sont ravis de vous convier à un 5 à 7, à l’occasion duquel Stephanie Leary (McGill), Christopher Howard (McGill) et Jonathan Simon (UdeM) présenteront leurs travaux. Les présentations d’une vingtaine de minutes chacune seront suivies, à tour de rôle, d’une période de discussion d’une même durée.
- 13 février 2020, 15h-17h.
Jesse Prinz & Sarah Arnaud (CUNY) : “Are There Emotions in the Brain?”
Salle/Room: W-5215, Pav. Thérèse Casgrain, UQAM (455 Boulevard René-Lévesque E, Montréal, QC H2L 4Y2)
Résumé/Abstract: Against an emerging tide of “constructionism” about discrete emotions, there are long-stranding research programs that claim to establish physiological correlates. Work on expressive behavior has moved beyond static faces to dynamic expressions, vocal patterns, and posture to find more robust analogues of discrete emotions in the body, and new work using pattern classifiers purports to establish that folk categories map onto the CNS and ANS. These views lobby for the possibility that folk categories can be more neatly reduced to physiology. Thus, the scientific status of discrete emotions remains in limbo. Here we steer a course between constructionism and reductionism, proposing an account of discrete emotions that takes both sides seriously. Work in the constructionist tradition testifies to considerably plasticity and against domain specificity at the level of neural implementation. Work by reductionists suggests that patterns can nevertheless emerge. We argue for a “reconstructionist” view, according to which discrete categories map only multiple bio-culturally constructed patterns.
- 12 mars 2020, 13h30 – 16h.
Ethical Knowledge and Deep Learning, with Preston Werner (Hebrew U, Jerusalem); Jonna Vance (Northern Arizona U); Ana Gantman (Brooklyn College).
MILA, auditorium 1, 6650 Saint-Urbain, 2e étage
- 13 mars 2020.
Journée de travail en philosophie analytique, ULaval
- REPORTÉ À L’AUTOMNE 2020
Responsabilité, normativité et langage – En hommage à Daniel Laurier
Lieu: salle C-1017-11, Carrefour des arts, Pavillon Lionel Groulx, 3150, rue Jean-Brillan,
métro Université de Montréal
Programme:
10:00-10:50 Montminy, Blameworthiness, Foreseeability and Causal Deviance
10:50-11:40 Paul Bernier, Karma et responsabilité morale dans le bouddhisme des origines
Lunch
13:30-14:20 Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette, PAP ssi DIP?
14:20-15:10 Martin Rémi Tison, Intentions de communication et cognition « de bas niveau »
15:20-16:10 Marc-Kevin Daoust, The Deontic Force of Apparent Reasons
16:10-17:00 Charles Côté-Bouchard, Déontologismes et involontarisme doxastique
- 27 et 28 mars 2020 -Annulé-
Virtue Ethics and Politics Workshop: The Personal and the Common Good
SOCIAL JUSTICE CENTRE
Room LB-362 (Third floor of the Webster Library), J.W. McConnell Bldg , Concordia University, SGW Campus, 1400 Maisonneuve Blvd W.
- REPORTÉ À L’AUTOMNE 2020
Robin Dembroff (Yale University) – GRIN/Thème phare éthique féministe
Salle/Room: 422, Stone Castle, (2910 Édouard-Montpetit, Université de Montréal)
- REPORTÉ À L’AUTOMNE 2020
Miriam McCormick (University of Richmond) “Belief as Emotion”
Salle/Room: 422, Stone Castle, (2910 Édouard-Montpetit, Université de Montréal)
Résumé/Abstract:
It is commonly held that (i) beliefs are evidence-sensitive and (ii) beliefs are connected to actions in reliable and predictable ways. Given such a view, many argue that if a mental state fails to respond to evidence or doesn’t result in the kind of behavior typical or expected of belief, it is not a belief after all, but a different state. Yet, one finds seeming counter examples of resilient beliefs that fail to respond to evidence, or that do not connect to action in the way we would expect them to. I offer a view of belief that does not force us to exclude states as real beliefs that we pre-reflectively think of as beliefs, and that does not require us to “outsource” the work belief seems to do to other mental states. Rather than assume that belief is a purely cognitive state, I propose that we view belief as a type of emotion where emotions are understood as including cognitive and non-cognitive elements. Thinking of beliefs as emotions can help us make sense of resilient or recalcitrant beliefs, of seeming breakdowns between belief and actions, and offer insight into the phenomena of persistent disagreement and self-deception.
- 12 et 13 mai 2020
Éthique, Justice et Connaissance / Ethics, Justice and Knowledge
Salle/Room: Zoom (écrire à valery.giroux@umontreal.ca)
Sébastien Gambs, Université du Québec à Montréal, « Respect de la vie privée et problématiques éthiques à l’ère des données massives »
Prabhpal Singh, University of Waterloo, “After-Birth Abortion, Moral Status, and the Relational View”
Anne-Marie Gagné-Julien, Université du Québec à Montréal, « La médicalisation des troubles mentaux, les injustices épsitémiques et l’objectivité sociale »
Aude Bandini, Université de Montréal, « Le paternalisme épistémique dans la relation de soin »
Aušra Kaziliūnaitė, Vilnius University, « Foucault’s panopticism and ethics of modern surveillance: ‘plague stricken down’ reactualisation during corona crises”
Michaël Lessard, University of Toronto, (Faculty of Law), « Reconnaître la sensibilité des animaux peut-il les protéger? »
Samuel Dishaw, Harvard University, “Duties to Future Generations : Rethinking the No-Difference View”
Russ Shafer-Laudau, University of Wisconsin, Madison, “Conceptual Moral Truths”
2018-2019
Ateliers/Workshops
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21 sept. 2018 :
Pamela Hieronymi (UCLA) “Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of Morals”
10h-12h – Salle : en vidéoconférence, salle P-217, Pavillon Roger-Gaudry, (2900 Édouard-Montpetit, Université de Montréal)
Abstract :
Fifty-five years after its publication, P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” continues to inspire important work. Its main legacy has been the notion of “reactive attitudes.” Surprisingly, Strawson’s
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12 oct. 2018 :
Dana Nelkin (University of California, San Diego)
“Equal Opportunity: A Unifying Framework for Moral, Aesthetic, and Epistemic Responsibility”
13h-15h – Salle :W-5215 – Pavillon Thérèse-Casgrain – UQÀM- en collaboration avec Fillosophie –
Abstract :
We naturally speak about moral obligations (e.g., “you ought to have kept your promise”) and we speak about epistemic ones and even sometimes what look like aesthetic ones, too (e.g., “you ought to have known that the polls were within the margin of error” and “you should have done better with that painting”). Similarly, we blame and praise people for epistemic and aesthetic transgressions and achievements, as well as moral ones. For these reasons, it is natural to conclude that our moral, aesthetic and epistemic practices should be treated in highly parallel ways, at least when it comes to the realm of holding responsible, praiseworthy, and blameworthy. At the same time, there are clear asymmetries between the moral and epistemic case, and also between the moral and the aesthetic, which might seem to doom any hope for a genuinely parallel treatment. For example, as many have pointed out, unlike actions or omissions, which are central objects of moral obligations, praise and blame, belief does not seem to be the kind of thing one has control over. When it comes to the aesthetic case, many have doubted that we have obligations in the way that we do in the other cases. Further, moral blame has seemed to many to be governed by a number of interpersonal norms that don’t seem to have parallels in either the pure epistemic or pure aesthetic case. Despite these challenges, I argue that the prospects are promising for a unifying framework that applies in all three cases while at the same time leaving room for divergence on some important dimensions. In particular, in this paper, I pursue the idea that one’s degree of blameworthiness or praiseworthiness depends on the quality of one’s opportunity in a given case.
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26 oct. 2018 :
Paul Boghossian (New York University) “The Boundaries of Inference”
15h-17h – Salle : 201, S Annex (2145 Mackay), Sir George Williams Campus, Concordia University, H3N 1M8
Abstract:
I will look at how we should decide the question what inference is and discuss some objections to my ‘intellectualist’ and ‘agential’ conception of inference.
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7 déc. 2018 :
Stephanie Leary (McGill) “What is Moorean Non-naturalism?”
10h-12h – Salle : 223 – Stone Castle – 2910 bvd Édouard-Montpetit (Université de Montréal)
Most metaethicists take the sort of non-naturalist view endorsed by Moore and his followers to amount to either a claim about identity or a claim about grounding. In this paper, however, I argue that specifying non-naturalism just in terms of identity is at best not illuminating, and specifying the view in terms of grounding either makes the naturalism vs. non-naturalism debate settled by general metaphysical considerations or fails to make room for Moore himself to count as a genuine non-naturalist. So, instead, I propose that we understand the view in terms of essence: specifically, as the claim that the essences of at least some normative properties cannot be ultimately specified in entirely non-normative terms and do not specify non-normative sufficient conditions for their instantiation. Characterizing the view in these terms most clearly captures the non-naturalist’s core pre-theoretical claims in a way that makes it a substantive, local view about normative properties and makes room for Moore.
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1 février 2019 :
Charles Côté-Bouchard (GRIN, CRÉ, Université de Montréal) “Varieties of epistemic constitutivism“
10h-12h – Salle : 223, Stone Castle – 2910 bvd Édouard-Montpetit (Université de Montréal)
Abstract:
Epistemic constitutivism (EC) seeks to ground the epistemic domain in constitutive features relevant to agency. In this presentation, I examine the prospects of EC via two distinctions within the epistemic constitutivist family. The first is between what I call requirement-constitutivism (ERC) and normative-constitutivism (ENC). This distinction is about what epistemic constitutivism should try to ground. While ERC only seeks to ground the requirements (norms, standards, rules) of epistemology, proponents of ENC want to go further and ground the normative authority of those epistemic requirements.The second distinction, which draws from recent work by Kate Nolfi and Amy Flowerree, is between belief-constitutivism (EBC) and action-constitutivism (EAC). This second distinction is about what should do the grounding in epistemic constitutivism. While EBC grounds the epistemic in what is constitutive of belief, EAC invokes the constitution of action or agency more generally. My goal is to formulate and evaluate the four possible versions of EC that we get from these distinctions. I argue that all four versions of EC face serious problems. Constitutivism is therefore not a promising approach to grounding the epistemic domain.
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1 mars 2019 :
Barry Maguire (Stanford University) “Ethical Desiderata for a Satisfactory Socialist Economics”
10h-12h – Salle : en vidéoconférence ; salle P-217, Pavillon Roger-Gaudry, (2900 Édouard-Montpetit, Université de Montréal)
Abstract: It has become rather old-fashioned to contrast the self-directed nature of market motives with the socialist ideal of a productive community in which each contributes according to their ability and is contributed to according to their need. A barrage of arguments from theorists in economics, psychology, political theory, and philosophy have weakened this contrast, arguing that market participation is compatible with a range of attractive kinds of social relations. In a series of papers, Robert Sugden and Luigino Bruni have argued that we can conceptualise market exchange as a joint activity undertaken together with the intention of realizing a mutual benefit. And so we can. The key question is whether this conceptualization is compatible with the relevant socialist ideal. This is the question that drives this talk. I start by strengthening Sugden and Bruni’s case, granting as many assumptions as possible to market theorists along the way. And still, I argue, there is at least one crucial difference between these two forms of economic society. In markets, our individual motivations to serve others in our productive lives are conditional upon self-directed concerns. In the socialist ideal, our motivations to serve others in our productive activities are instead directly explained by a commitment to serve our community in some useful way. We may yet be willing and able to uphold this commitment only if doing so is compatible with living a good life oneself. I explore the nature and significance of this contrast, partly by application to cases of price gouging, salary negotiations, and gentrification.
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5 avril 2019 :
Lisa Tessman (Binghamton University) “Failure without Fault”
10h-12h – Salle : 307, Stone Castle – 2910 bvd Édouard-Montpetit, UdeM
Abstract:
People often suffer from anguish or other distressed emotions in the wake of their own moral failures. Drawing on the literature on “moral distress” (in medical ethics) and “moral injury” (in military ethics), I compare situations in which people suffer in the aftermath of what are moral failures only in their own eyes, and situations in which they suffer in the aftermath of wrongdoings for which other people, too, may hold them accountable. When a wrongdoing is completely unavoidable, people often still take themselves to be responsible for it, but other people cannot hold them responsible. The anguished sense of responsibility experienced in the wake of unavoidable wrongdoing expresses an important form of valuing, that, I suggest, other people should respect by refraining from pushing the sufferer to relinquish it. To better understand this, I examine both the first-person experience of being required and the sense of requirement experienced from what, following Darwall, we can call the second-person standpoint. I take first-person experiences of requirement and second-person address to be two different sources of normativity, associated with opportunities for different kinds of failures.
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9 avril 2019 :
Caroline T. Arruda (University of Texas) “Sticking to it and Settling: Commitments, Normativity and the Future”
10h-12h – Salle : C-1017-02, Carrefour des Arts et des Sciences, 1er étage, Pavillon Lionel-Groulx – 3150, rue Jean-Brillant, UdeM
Abstract:
People often think that commitments are designed to secure various aspects of the way we exercise our agency over and through time. These include the following: commitments help us to resist temptation (Holton 2009; Marušić 2015 ); commitments block re-deliberation (Bratman 2004; 2016; 2018 Hinchman 2015; Holton 2009); commitments help us to do what we correctly think that we are unlikely to do (Marušić 2015 ); commitments ensure (or provide one route by which to ensure) the diachronic stability of our intentions or decisions (Morton 2013; Morton & Paul forthcoming). Broadly speaking, we can say that commitments are a source of what we might broadly classify as agential stability. Or, more simply, commitments explain how and why I should “stick to it” or “settle” on a course of action. In this paper, I argue that paradigmatic cases of commitments reveal that commitments themselves cannot nor could not provide any of these kinds of agential stability. Instead, I show that if commitments serve any of these functions, it is in virtue of their relationship to what we care about, what has import for us or what we value. If this is correct, it follows that it isn’t the commitment that does the work in explaining why we should “stick to it”; it is the reasons that we have to form the commitment in the first place.
2017-2018 Ateliers/Workshops
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20 oct. 2017 :
Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (Tufts University) “Value Ascriptions”
10h-12h – Salle : 223 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)
Abstract:
This paper focuses on value as ascribed to what can be desired, enjoyed, cherished, admired, loved, and so on: value that putatively serves as ground for evaluating such attitudes and for justifying conduct. The main question of the paper is whether such value ascriptions are property ascriptions and why anyone would even think so. Given how the disagreement between cognitivists and non-cognitivists is traditionally construed within metaethics, the question concerns whether cognitivism provides the right approach to value ascriptions and what the basic motivation for that approach is. According to the philosophical lore, the structure of evaluative thought and language prima facie favors the cognitivist thesis that value ascriptions are property ascriptions. This paper rethinks the lessons to be drawn from the structure of evaluative thought and language. The paper does not take sides in the traditional debate between cognitivism and non-cognitivism but, instead, questions how the debate about the nature of value ascriptions has traditionally been framed.
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12 janv. 2018 :
Nomy Arpaly (Brown University) “On Benevolence”
14h-16h – Salle DS-1950 (320, rue Sainte Catherine Est, UQÀM)
Abstract:
It is widely agreed that benevolence is not the whole of the moral life, but it is not as widely appreciated that benevolence is an irreducible part of that life. This paper argues that Kantian efforts to characterize benevolence, or something like it, in terms of reverence for rational agency fall short. Such reverence, while credibly an important part of the moral life, is no more the whole of it than benevolence.
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26 janv. 2018 :
Dale Dorsey (The University of Kansas) “Preferences and Prudential Reasons”
10h-12h – 223 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)
Preference-based theories of the personal good seem to face a problematic implication in cases of prudential choice. It would seem to make little difference to the quality of a person’s life were they to achieve the content of their preferences rather than to simply direct their preferences toward that which already obtains. If, for instance, Faith has the choice to simply sign the papers to become an astronaut (which she longs to do) or take a preference-altering pill such that she prefers to remain Earth-bound, a preference-based theory of the good seems to have no principled way to avoid the conclusion that it would be perfectly prudentially rational for Faith to simply flip a coin. In this paper, I argue that this implication depends on two interpretive choices: first, the interpretation of a preference-based theory of the good and, second, the interpretation of prudential reasons and prudential rationality. I argue that these interpretations are not forced, and that interpreting them in a way that avoids this problematic neutrality is defensible.
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9 fév. 2018 :
Ralph Wedgwood (University of Southern California) “The Measurement of Value”
10h-12h – Salle 223 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)
Abstract:
When one state of affairs A is in a way better than another state of affairs B, does it make sense to inquire how much better A is in this way than B? Is goodness amenable to any kind of cardinal measurement?
In the utilitarian tradition, it sometimes seems implicitly assumed that goodness is amenable to the same kind of extensive measurement as quantities like mass or volume. According to this assumption, goodness is like a kind of stuff, and inquiring how good the world is as a whole is like inquiring about the total mass or volume of this stuff in the world as a whole. It will be argued here this assumption is open to grave objections.
An alternative account is suggested. First, there is reason to think that goodness can be measured on an interval scale (not a ratio scale). Goodness seems to form a difference structure: we can meaningfully say, not only that one state of affairs is better than another, but also that the first state is “much better” or “slightly better” than the other. In other words, we can compare differences in value between pairs of states of affairs.
Secondly, the best explanation of this lies in a fundamental connection between value and probability. In effect, it is part of the job description of a value that it should play nicely with probability functions. Every value is capable of interacting with every probability function to provide a corresponding notion of expected value (according to that probability function). This requires that the value must have the kind of quantitative structure that can be captured by an interval scale.
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23 mars 2018 :
Ulf Hlobil (Concordia University) “On Weighing Reasons with Defeaters”
10h-12h – 223 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)
Abstract:
According to the Reasoning View about normative reasons, R is a normative reason to φ just in case R can figure as a premise in good reasoning that results in φ-ing. As is widely recognized among advocates of the Reasoning View (e.g. Setiya, Way, Asarnow), the most important challenge for the Reasoning View is to give an account of how reasons can be outweighed. It is also widely recognized that this is best done by appeal to the defeasibility of reasoning. After introducing the Reasoning View, I start by criticizing different accounts of weights in terms of defeasibility. I then offer my own account of the weights in terms of defeasibility. A crucial feature of the account is that it distinguishes premises of practical reasoning from background attitudes. Along the way, I introduce notions of enablers, obligations, and virtuous action. I end by suggesting that the “objective ought” and “objective reasons” are idealizations, and that the “subjective ought” and “subjective reasons” are primary.
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14 mai 2018 :
Jonathan Way (University of Southampton)
“The Distinctiveness of Fittingness” (Co-authored with Conor McHugh)
According to fitting-attitudes accounts of value, evaluative properties are to be analysed in terms of what’s fitting to value – e.g. the admirable is what’s fitting to admire, the delightful is what’s fitting to delight in, the loathsome is what’s fitting to loathe. Such accounts raise the question of what it is to be fitting to value something. While some proponents of fitting-attitudes accounts analyse fittingness in terms of reasons, obligations, or permissibility, others have suggested that fittingness is a distinctive and unanalysable normative property.
This paper defends this latter view. We proceed by noting three marks of fittingness: that incentives for attitudes do not bear on their fittingness, that fitting is stronger than permissibility but weaker than obligation, and that absences of attitudes cannot be fitting. We argue that these marks allow us to distinguish fittingness from other normative properties and cast doubt on the prospects of analysing fittingness in other normative terms. The upshot is support not only for fitting-attitude accounts of value but for fitting-attitude accounts of other normative properties too.
2016-2017 Journées
15 mai, 2017
Salle: 422 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)
Attitudes, Rationality and Concepts
16-17 mars, 2017
Salle: A-2407 (Université de Montréal, Pavillon Maximilien-Caron, 3101 chemin de la tour)
L’Esprit et les Valeurs, Journées du GRIN
23 février, 2017
Salle: Salle C-2059 (Carrefour des Arts et des Sciences, UdeM, 3150 Rue Jean-Brillant)
Bien être, Normativité et “Bien pour”
10 nov., 2016,
Salle: 0040, (Pavillon d’aménagement, 2940 Chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine, UdeM)
Nouvelles Perspectives sur la Duperie de Soi
29-30 sept., 2016,
Salle: C-3061 (Carrefour des Sciences, UdeM)
Time and Intentionality, International Conference
Ateliers/workshops 2016-2017 :
(liste)
25 septembre, 2015, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: 927 (Pavillon Leacock, Université McGill, métros Peel ou McGill)
Miriam McCormick (University of Richmond), Are constitutive norms normative?
Résumé: In the current debate about which norm governs belief – truth, knowledge, justification, or something else, what is most often in question is which is the constitutive norm, namely what norm do we uncover when thinking about the nature of belief, what a belief is. I argue that answering the question of whether a belief is permissible, or appropriate, sometimes requires going beyond what can be discovered by appeal to constitutive norms, and I suggest that it will likely take us into the practical and moral domain.
13 novembre, 2015, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: 223 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)
David Hunter (Ryerson University), Virtuous inferences and virtuous thinkers (Or, sweeping away Broome’s dispositions)
Résumé: Following Aristotle, John Broome claims that a mental transition is an inference only if it flows from a prior disposition to perform such transitions. Without the disposition the transition would be passive like digestion as opposed to active like eating. But this comparison and contrast are misleading. Eating, but not reasoning, involves various means and different parts, can be done with a purpose and from a motive, and can be voluntary. And digestion is something that a person does, not something—like muscular cellular mitosis—that merely happens inside her. But whereas digestion is merely contingently involuntary, reasoning is essentially involuntary. What makes a transition an inference, I argue, are the explanatory links connecting the beliefs involved in it and what makes it active is the self-awareness characteristic of activity.
20 novembre, 2015, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: W-5215 (455 Blvd René-Lévesque E, UQÀM, métro Berri-UQÀM)
Jason Bridges (University of Chicago), Against choice
Résumé: Contemporary philosophers tend to take for granted that fundamental questions about the nature and structure of practical rationality are appropriately framed in terms of the concept of choice among alternatives. Thus, for example, the debate between maximalist and satisfactionist theories of rational requirements presupposes that the business of requirements of rationality is to govern the agent’s selection of an action from amongst a set of available options. I argue against this orientation. The concept that structures practical rationality at the most basic level is not choosing but acting, not selecting A over B, but, simply, doing A, and recognizing that this is so has important implications for how we understand our capacity to respond to reasons for action. I elucidate and defend this claim through a consideration of the teleological character of practical reasons, and then briefly sketch its implications both for the topic of rational requirements and for questions about the nature of the will recently brought to attention by Joseph Raz.
11 décembre 2015, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: Université Concordia, Henry F. Hall Building, H-1220
Patrick Rysiew (University of Victoria), Practical Bases, Binding Norms, Constitutive Aims
This paper considers Hilary Kornblith’s (1993, 2002) suggestion that epistemic norms have “a practical basis”. I argue that Kornblith’s view withstands many of the objections that have been made against it, and that it constitutes an improvement over certain other views that seek to ground epistemic normativity in considerations of value. But it doesn’t do everything: while they may be an essential part of the story, practical considerations alone don’t fully explain epistemic norms and their basis. In addition, Kornblith’s proposal requires, and seems to presume, ideas associated with accounts often thought to be competitors to the kind of view Kornblith endorses. However, while this may show that Kornblith’s view is incomplete, it doesn’t show that it’s incorrect. This, because Kornblith’s approach and the idea (for example) that belief as such is governed by certain norms needn’t be competing; in fact, they may be interestingly complementary.
8 janvier 2016, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: UQÀM, 455 Blvd René-Lévesque E, local W-5215
Shaun Nichols (University of Arizona), Rational learners and moral rules
Philosophical observation and psychological studies indicate that people draw subtle distinctions in the normative domain. But it remains unclear exactly what gives rise to such distinctions. On one prominent approach, emotion systems trigger non-utilitarian judgments. The main alternative, inspired by Chomskyan linguistics, suggests that moral distinctions derive from an innate moral grammar. In this paper, we develop a rational learning account. We argue that the “size principle”, which is implicated in word learning (Xu & Tenenbaum 2007), can also explain how children would use scant and equivocal evidence to interpret candidate rules as applying more narrowly than utilitarian rules.
***ANNULÉ*** – 5 février 2016, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: Université de Montréal, 2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, local 223
Frédérique de Vignemont (Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris), A narcissistic conception of the sense of bodily ownership
Résumé: Cette conférence est annulée.
18 mars 2016, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: Université McGill, pavillon Leacock, local 927
Julia Markovits (Cornell), On What It Is To Matter
Résumé: Derek Parfit worries that Subjectivism about what matters – the view that our reasons for acting depend in some way on facts about what we desire – entails a bleak and nihilistic picture of the normative world. He argues that we’re misled into accepting Subjectivism by a series of considerations, none of which actually support the view, though they may at first appear to. Understanding why many of us believe Subjectivism will, he thinks, debunk that belief.
I will argue that Parfit’s debunking arguments are less debunking than he thinks, and indeed supply a way in to what is missing from his discussion: a sketch of the some stronger arguments for a subjectivist theory of reasons. Subjectivism is, moreover, not as bleak a view as Parfit fears; and indeed, I will argue, Parfit’s own conciliatory ambitions for moral philosophy should make him much more sympathetic to the subjectivist project than he is.
2015 – 16
26 septembre, 2014, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: 307 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)
3 octobre, 2014, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: 307 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)
Jill Rusin (Wilfrid Laurier University) « Epistemic Access and Culpable Ignorance »
Abstract:
Elizabeth Harman and Gideon Rosen disagree about whether moral ignorance exculpates. I examine their arguments and compare to a more moderate position, based on a ‘reasonable person’ interpretation of excusable ignorance. This view takes epistemic accessibility to be of significance to culpability. But I argue that a subject’s access needs to be assessed via relevant counterfactuals, not merely by narrow intuitions about ‘available evidence’, a suggestion motivated by looking at cases of ‘motivated ignorance’. This idea exposes what I take to be problematically artificial in how Harman and Rosen approach their disagreement: they stipulate adequate procedural management of the subjects’ beliefs as a background condition in cases they discuss. I find, however, that in certain significant cases, procedural mismanagement is explicable by the very reason that both explains the ignorance and makes it culpable.
17 octobre 2014, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: 422 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)
Hichem Naar (Université de Montréal), « The Significance of Quasi-Doxastic Attitudes »
Abstract:
This paper argues that there is class of attitudes, ‘quasi-doxastic attitudes’, which are belief-like in having conditions of correctness, but which are action-like in their relationship to reasoning and reasons, and discusses the significance of this fact for a recent debate about the nature of reasons for attitudes.
7 novembre 2014, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: 422 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)
Ulrike Heuer (University of Leeds), « Two Kinds of Wrong Reasons »
14 novembre 2014
Journée du GRIN: Normativité et Perception, organisé par Maxime Doyon
Salle: c-2059 (Pavillon Lionel-Groulx, 3150 rue Jean-Brillant, métro Université de Montréal)
12 décembre 2014, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: 422 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)
30 janvier 2014, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: 307 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)
Michele Palmira (Université de Montréal) « Outline of a new approach to epistemic peer disagreement »
Abstract:
The aim of this talk is to outline a new approach to the problem of epistemic peer disagreement. The main point is to argue for the compatibility between the idea that the epistemic significance of peer disagreement is the same in all cases and the view that the rational response to peer disagreement may vary depending on the specific case of disagreement.
20 février 2015, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: W-5215, Pavillon Thérèse-Casgrain (455 Boul. René-Lévesque E., métro Berri-UQAM) voir carte
27 mars 2015, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: Leacock 927 (855 rue Sherbrooke O., métro McGill) voir carte
John Brunero (University of Nebraska – Lincoln) « Intentions and the Bootstrapping Objection »
24 avril 2015, 10:00 – 12:00 (ANNULÉ)
Salle: W-5215, Pavillon Thérèse-Casgrain (455 Boul. René-Lévesque E., métro Berri-UQAM) voir carte
John Turri (University of Waterloo), titre à confirmer
30 avril, 1 mai 2015
Journées du GRIN: Normativité et Métaéthique, organisé Hichem Naar, Michele Palmira et Christine Tappolet, en collaboration avec le CRÉ
Salle: 307 et 422, 2910 boulevard Edouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal
2014 – 15
26 septembre, 2014, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: 307 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)
Michael Blome-Tillmann (University of Cambridge) “The Role of Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law”
3 octobre, 2014, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: 307 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)
Jill Rusin (Wilfrid Laurier University) “Epistemic Access and Culpable Ignorance”
Abstract:
Elizabeth Harman and Gideon Rosen disagree about whether moral ignorance exculpates. I examine their arguments and compare to a more moderate position, based on a ‘reasonable person’ interpretation of excusable ignorance. This view takes epistemic accessibility to be of significance to culpability. But I argue that a subject’s access needs to be assessed via relevant counterfactuals, not merely by narrow intuitions about ‘available evidence’, a suggestion motivated by looking at cases of ‘motivated ignorance’. This idea exposes what I take to be problematically artificial in how Harman and Rosen approach their disagreement: they stipulate adequate procedural management of the subjects’ beliefs as a background condition in cases they discuss. I find, however, that in certain significant cases, procedural mismanagement is explicable by the very reason that both explains the ignorance and makes it culpable.
17 octobre 2014, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: 422 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)
Hichem Naar (Université de Montréal), “The Significance of Quasi-Doxastic Attitudes”
Abstract:
This paper argues that there is class of attitudes, ‘quasi-doxastic attitudes’, which are belief-like in having conditions of correctness, but which are action-like in their relationship to reasoning and reasons, and discusses the significance of this fact for a recent debate about the nature of reasons for attitudes.
7 novembre 2014, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: 422 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)
Ulrike Heuer (University of Leeds), “Two Kinds of Wrong Reasons”
14 novembre 2014
Journée du GRIN: Normativité et Perception, organisé par Maxime Doyon
Salle: c-2059 (Pavillon Lionel-Groulx, 3150 rue Jean-Brillant, métro Université de Montréal)
12 décembre 2014, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: 422 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)
30 janvier 2014, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: 307 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)
Michele Palmira (Université de Montréal) “Outline of a new approach to epistemic peer disagreement”
Abstract:
The aim of this talk is to outline a new approach to the problem of epistemic peer disagreement. The main point is to argue for the compatibility between the idea that the epistemic significance of peer disagreement is the same in all cases and the view that the rational response to peer disagreement may vary depending on the specific case of disagreement.
20 février 2015, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: W-5215, Pavillon Thérèse-Casgrain (455 Boul. René-Lévesque E., métro Berri-UQAM) voir carte
27 mars 2015, 10:00 – 12:00
Salle: Leacock 927 (855 rue Sherbrooke O., métro McGill) voir carte
John Brunero (University of Nebraska – Lincoln) “Intentions and the Bootstrapping Objection”
24 avril 2015, 10:00 – 12:00 (ANNULÉ)
Salle: W-5215, Pavillon Thérèse-Casgrain (455 Boul. René-Lévesque E., métro Berri-UQAM) voir carte
John Turri (University of Waterloo), titre à confirmer
30 avril, 1 mai 2015
Journées du GRIN: Normativité et Métaéthique, organisé Hichem Naar, Michele Palmira et Christine Tappolet, en collaboration avec le CRÉ
Salle: 307 et 422, 2910 boulevard Edouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal
2013 – 2014
6 septembre, 2013
Mark Lance (Georgetown University) Life is not a Box-Score: Lived Normativity, Abstract Evaluation, and the Is/Ought Distinction
8 novembre, 2013
Adina Roskies (Dartmouth College) On Being a Causa Sui
29 novembre, 2013
Oisín Deery (Université de Montréal) A Causal-Modeling Approach to Manipulation Arguments and Frankfurt Cases
10 janvier, 2014
Paul Russell (UBC) Compatibilism and Moral Luck: Problem or Predicament?
31 janvier, 2014
Fabrice Teroni (University of Bern) Emotions and Fiction
21 février, 2014
Journée du CRÉUM/GRIN: Attitudes, values and environment (voir programme)
Conférenciers invités: Gregory Mikkelson (McGill), Graham Oddie (Colorado at Boulder), Katie McShane (Colorado State), Mauro Rossi (UQAM), Christopher Kelly (independent scholar)
*Cet atelier est organisé par Antoine C.-Dussault et Christine Tappolet pour le CRÉUM et le GRIN.
28 février – 1 mars, 2014
Journées du GRIN: normativité et survenance (voir programme)
Conférenciers invités: Bartosz Brozek (Jagiellonian University), Gerald Harrison (Massey University), Carla Bagnoli (University of Modena), Daniel Laurier (Université de Montréal), Antonino Rotolo (University of Bologna), Brian McLaughlin (Rutgers)
*Cet atelier est rendu possible en partie par une subvention du CRSH partagée par Josée Brunet (Inst. de technologie Agro-Alimentaire, Sainte-Hyacinthe) et Daniel Laurier (Université de Montréal)
7 mars, 2014
(en collaboration avec le département de philosophie de l’UQAM)
Michael Zimmerman (UNC-Greensboro) Ignorance as a Moral Excuse
21 mars, 2014
Journée du GRIN: Symposium sur Rationality through Reasoning (2013) de John Broome (voir programme)
Conférenciers invités: John Broome (Oxford), Paul Boghossian (NYU), Andrew Reisner (McGill), Nadeem Hussain (Stanford)
*Cette atelier est rendu possible en partie par une subvention du CRSH partagée par Josée Brunet (Inst. de technologie Agro-Alimentaire, Sainte-Hyacinthe) et Daniel Laurier (Université de Montréal)
25 avril, 2014
Matthew Chrisman (Univerisité d’Edinburg) Making up Our Minds and What We Ought to Believe
12 – 13 mai, 2014
Symposium SPQ 2014 – La normativité: découverte ou invention ? (voir programme)
* Ce symposium fut organisé par Sébastien Laliberté et David Rocheleau-Houle.
2012 – 2013
1 février, 2013
Mark Nelson (Westmount College) What the Utilitarian Cannot Think
22 mars, 2013
Selim Berker (Harvard) Does Evolutionary Psychology Show That Reasons for Action Are Mind-Dependent?
19 avril, 2013
Martin Gibert (McGill) Perception et progrès moral
17 mai, 2013
Journée du GRIN: Normativity and Attitudes
Conférenciers invités:
13 juin, 2013
Chrisoula Andreou (University of Utah) Parity, Comparability, and Choice
2011 – 2012
11 novembre, 2011
Nigel DeSouza (Ottawa), Pre-reflective ethical know-how
25 novembre, 2011
Jérôme Dokic (EHESS), On the Very Idea of Moral Perception
16 mars, 2012
Aude Bandini (CRÉUM et UQÀM), La dérive de la croyance
13 avril, 2012
Constantine Sandis (Oxford Brookes University), Action in Ethics
26 avril, 2012
2010 – 2011
8 octobre, 2010
Terence Cuneo (University of Vermont), Moral Realism: Substance and Strategy
5 novembre, 2010
Michael Blome-Tillmann (McGill University), Some Thoughts on Epistemic Justification and Reliability
26 novembre, 2010
Table ronde du GRIN : “Moral Aggregation”, d’Iwao Hirose (McGill University) avec Peter Dietsch (Université de Montréal) Tyler Doggett (University of Vermont) Mauro Rossi (UQÀM) Sarah Stroud (McGill University)
14 janvier, 2011
Asbjørn Steglich-Peterson (University of Aarhus), Luck and Normativity
4 février, 2011
Martin Peterson (Eindhoven University of Technology), Multi-dimensional Consequentialism
25 mars, 2011
Adam Morton (University of Alberta), Conventional Norms of Reasoning
15 avril, 2011
Abe Roth (Ohio State University), Reasons at hand and second hand
10 – 11 mai, 2011
Symposium SPQ 2011 – Normativité et relativisme (voir programme)
2009 – 2010
2 octobre, 2009
Michael Zimmerman (North Carolina, Greensboro), Partiality and Intrinsic Value
9 octobre, 2009
Iwao Hirose (McGill), Choosing what is Rational
23 octobre, 2009
Stéphane Lemaire (Rennes), Reconstruire le concept de responsabilité
27 octobre, 2009
John Broome (Oxford), Instrumental Rationality
27 novembre, 2009
Victoria McGeer (Princeton), Co-reactive attitudes and the making of moral community
11 décembre, 2009
Daniel Star (Boston), Two Levels of Moral Thinking
20 mars, 2010
Jonas Olson (Stockholm) Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism
12 – 14 mai, 2010
Symposium SPQ, La normativité et la nature humaine (voir programme)
*Ce symposium fut organisé par Patrick Turmel, Benoît Dubreuil et Christine Tappolet.
mai, 2010
Symposium CPA, Knowledge, Belief, and Normativity (voir programme)
* Ce symposium fut organisé par Yves Bouchard.