Ateliers du GRIN 2016 – 17

(Plus de détails à venir/More details to come)


Ateliers à venir/Upcoming workshops:


16 septembre, 2016, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: 223 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Neil Sinhababu (National University of Singapore), From Moral Twin Earth to Pleasure in Eden
Résumé: Many popular works of science fiction involve humans and aliens meeting for the first time and disagreeing with each other about moral questions. Unfortunately, the causal theory of reference renders such disagreements impossible, as Moral Twin Earth cases show. To account for the breadth of possible disagreement, I offer a new theory of moral concepts and how they represent reality. I offer a theory of representation based on empathy, according to which moral feelings like guilt, horror, and admiration represent their objects in virtue of shared phenomenal character. This version of the Edenic account of representation described by David Chalmers provides a new argument for ethical hedonism.


29-30 septembre, 2016

Time and Intentionality International Conference (Université de Montréal)


10 novembre, 2016, 13:30 – 17:45

Salle: 0040 Pavillon d’aménagement (2940 Chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine, métro Université de Montréal)

Nouvelles Perspectives sur la Duperie De Soi/New Perspectives on Self-Deception: Aude Bandini (Université de Montréal), Martina Orlandi (McGill University), Melanie Sarzano (University of Basel), Marie Van Loon (University of Basel)


11 novembre, 2016, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: 223 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Anne Meylan (University of Basel), Virtue Epistemology: Metaphysical Implications
Résumé: A key claim of virtue epistemology (Greco 2012; Sosa 2009, 2011, 2015) is that the normativity characterizing knowledge is the one characterizing performances in general. To put it briefly, knowledge is valuable in the way performances are valuable. As Chrisman (2012, 2016) emphasizes, this is problematic since we have linguistic reasons to take knowledge to be a state and states are to be distinguished from performances (Kenny 1963). The purpose of this presentation is to resist Chrisman’s line of thought. Mainly, I will, first, show that there exists, in the cognitive realm of beliefs and knowledge, what Steward (2012, 2015) names “individual processes”. Second, nothing precludes these cognitive individual processes from displaying the kind of normativity that characterizes performances in general.

9 décembre, 2016, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: 422 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Kieran Setiya (MIT), Other People
Résumé: I will argue for the role of personal acquaintance in both love and concern for individuals, as such. The challenge is to say what personal acquaintance is and why it matters in the way it does. These questions are addressed through the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Topics include: the ethics of aggregation, the basis of moral standing, and the value of human life.


2 février, 2017, 13:00 – 16:00

To trust or not to trust?

Salle: Leacock 429 (855 rue Sherbrooke O., métro McGill)


Karen Jones (The University of Melbourne), Wise trust


Jason D’Cruz (University at Albany, SUNY), Renouncing Distrust


16-17 février, 2017

5èmes Journées de Métaéthique – Le Constructivisme Métaéthique et ses Critiques

Université de Lausanne – Anthropole 5196




23 février 2017, 10:00 – 16:45

Bien-être, normativité et «bien pour» / Well-being, normativity and «good for»

Salle C-2059 Carrefour des Arts et des Sciences, UdeM (3150 Rue Jean-Brillant)


Krister Bykvist (Stockholm), Prudence, well-being, and changing attitude

Guy Fletcher (Edinburgh), Is well-being normative?


Paul Boswell (CRÉ), Good-For, Normativity, and the Myth of Jones

Nandi Theunissen (Johns Hopkins), The Normativity of Good For


24 février 2017, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: 422 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Krister Bykvist (Stockholm University), A Moorean argument against Brentano-style analyses of ‘good’
Résumé: Suppose with Brentano that ‘good’ means ‘worthy of love’. Then ‘A is less good than B’ means ‘A is less worthy of love than B’. Brentano also says that ‘A is less good than B’ means ‘A is worthy of less love than B’.
Moore argues that ‘A is less worthy of love than B’ does not mean the same as ‘A is worthy of less love than B’. Hence, if Moore is right, something is deeply wrong with Brentano’s analysis of ‘good’. But can his analysis (and similar ones) be refuted by such a simple argument? That is the question I will discuss in my talk.


10 mars 2017, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: 422 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Kyla Ebels-Duggan (Northwestern University), Love and Agency
Résumé: Our ordinary talk reflects a deep tension in the way that we think about love. On the one hand, we regard love, as not just an expression of our agency, but an especially important one. Yet, on the other hand, we also think of love as something that happens to us, in the face of which we are passive and can be powerless. While it’s hard to see how to hold these two ways of thinking of love together, in this paper I argue that we must find some way of doing so. Abandoning the idea that love is something that we do, not just something that we experience, would require significant revision in our practical thinking. But familiar notions of agency sort love as passive rather than active. I conclude that questions about the relationship of our agency to what we love are not superficial, but stem from deep tensions about the relationship between love and reasons. A resolution to these difficulties would provide important insight not only into the character of love, but also the nature of agency, and its relationship to values, reasoning and reasons.


16-17 mars 2017, journée entière

L’Esprit et les valeurs / Mind and Value

Keynote speaker: Peter Railton (University of Michigan)


17 mars 2017, 10:30 – 12:30

Salle: W-5215, UQAM (405 Rue Sainte-Catherine Est, métro Berri-UQAM)

Neil Levy (Macquarie university), Fake News!
Résumé: We are surrounded by sources of information of dubious reliability, and very many people consume information from these sources. This paper examines the impacts on our beliefs of these reports. I will argue that fake news is more pernicious than most of us realise, leaving long lasting traces on our beliefs and our behavior even when we consume it know it is fake or when the information it contains is corrected. These effects are difficult to correct. We therefore ought to avoid fake or dubious news and work to eliminate it.


21 avril 2017, 10:00 – 12:00

Salle: 422 (2910 Boul. Édouard-Montpetit, métro Université de Montréal)

Frédérique de Vignemont (Institut Jean Nicod), The sense of bodily ownership: an affective feeling
Résumé: When I complain, “I feel pain in my shoulder”, there are two occurrences of the first person pronoun: at the level of the subject of the painful experience (I feel pain) and at the level of the body part in which I localize pain (in my shoulder). The first expresses the subjectivity of my sensation. The second expresses the awareness of my body as my own. Most philosophical interest has focused on the first, but what has been called the sense of bodily ownership – for want of a better name – has also recently come into the limelight both in the philosophical literature and in the psychological literature. Here I will defend a reductionist approach, according to which the sense of ownership can be reduced to some specific properties of bodily experiences. But which properties? I will argue that the feeling of bodily ownership should be conceived of on the model of the feeling of familiarity and that it consists in the sense of the spatial boundaries of one’s body as having a special significance for the self.